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SCENARIOS OF SOVIET THREAT TO NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK

Rome AVANTI in Italian 10 Jul 81 p 11

[Article by Falco Accame: "Reasons for Territorial Defense"]

[Text] Recently, the strategic importance of the Mediterranean has increased significantly, above all due to our vital dependence on oil coming from the Persian Gulf and from North Africa. The situation has progressively deteriorated because of the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, the Lebanese tragedy, friction between Syria and Iraq, between Egypt and Libya and the war between Iran and Iraq, which shows no sign of letting up. But the most proximate causes for anxiety are Libya's attempts to engender closer contacts with the USSR, on one hand, and our commitment, on the other, for the military defense of Malta. Therefore, the dangers originating from the south can no longer be ignored.

In 1951, when NATO reigned supreme in the Mediterranean, its main concern focused on the invasion of Europe by the Red Army. Today on the other hand, the real danger lies in the possible interdiction of our oil routes brought about by a local conflict in the Mediterranean or possibly because of a more widespread Soviet design which aims at the takeover of the Persian Gulf.

The outlook is not encouraging. While Afghanistan has been irretrievably lost, and its takeover greatly facilitating operations directed against Iran, events are moving in accordance with the Soviet intent of depriving the West of Iranian oil. Therefore the Persian Gulf is becoming a source of concern, where differences between American and European policies have already developed. Western experts agree that a clash between the forces present today in the Persian Gulf would surely mean success for the USSR. The American plan to send 100,000 troops to Europe in a matter of days is still on the drawing board. Furthermore, the recent development of a rapid intervention force in Egypt turned out to be a veritable technical and strategic failure, though the national press minimized and underemphasized the fact.

The Soviet design of encirclement of the Persian Gulf from the West has begun to take place: the maneuver in fact, occurs along two axes: through Afghanistan from the East and through the "Red Belt" from the West, whose pivotal points are Libya and Aden: only Sudan is the missing link. In this context, the Libya-Chad connection can be understood.

Libya represents an instrument of a vast Soviet plan, with the aim of increased penetration of the Mediterranean. Sudan, where Libya has promoted and financed counterrevolutionary designs, engendering serious preoccupations, has come under aim. Along the border with Chad, subversive and sabotage operations or even perhaps an invasion could be brought about. Tomorrow, the Mediterranean, and Italy in particular, might come under their sights. It is well known that the USSR has sent aid to Libya and has transformed it into a veritable arsenal in which, with consistent help from us, an enormous quantity of tanks, missiles, radars, aircraft and sophisticated equipment (which the Libyans will never be able to use efficiently) has been stockpiled. It is thus evident that all this hardware will be driven by outside personnel, which can be flown into Libya in a matter of hours. No one in Italy appears to be aware of this grave situation. That Qadhafi may nourish dreams of imperialism should come as no surprise. His Soviet bosses may take advantage of his ambitions, for example by exploiting what has occurred in Chad and in the Sudan. One must realize there is a chain of bases in the area of Tobruk near the Egyptian and Tunisian borders, built by the Soviets, in addition of the ones built to the South, in the Sahara. With this kind of support network, it may be possible that Qadhafi may start thinking in terms of extending his influence in various directions, including that of Sicily.

At the present, the status quo in the Persian Gulf is maintained by the threat of nuclear weapons by the United States, in case such weapons are used by the Soviets or in case of an extension of the Afghan operation. But is such balance acceptable? And how long can it last? Obviously, it will become necessary to define a precise line of demarcation outlining vital Soviet interests as well as vital American and European ones, similar in form to that presently in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. No one can predict where this line will be drawn. Hopefully, it will be at a table and not on a battlefield that the two superpowers will do their armwrestling. The whole Mediterranean area could be forced to participate in this test of strength.

The time has arrived to articulate a principle: the defense of the Mediterranean does not consist solely of control of the seas, but above all in the defense of the coastal areas and of the hinterland.

With the loss of land areas, comes also the loss of the Mediterranean Sea. The concept of "regionalization of defense" originates from this need, namely a need for a more balanced distribution of forces on the national territory. This concept until now has been considered of no consequence by the General Staff (although they have now begun to talk about "diluting" the defense structure of the national territory). In the present strategic context, is it acceptable to concentrate almost all the Italian Army along the "Gorizia Gap?" We have just gone through two telling experiences on the efficacy of the defense of the peninsula: a Libyan aircraft overflew our territory and we became aware of it only due to the fact that its wreckage was found on the ground. Army units in the North, which are supposed to be "quality" units in a high state of readiness, liable to be called upon in a matter of hours, were days late in coming to the rescue in the area hit by earthquakes. Can we count on this type of defense for the peninsula and the islands? It forces one to imagine realistic scenarios that take into account the "international situation and the geo-strategic parameters linking it to Italy." Therefore: the reality of the matter is that the strategic situation has definitely been altered and the hostile threat has shifted from the Center-North to the Southern flank of NATO.

The "Gorizia Gap" concept was conceived under different circumstances, in another era, when the Center-North harbored the real menace. Today one must become aware of the new situation and to have the courage to set aside outdated concepts and bring the doctrine of national defense in consonance with the new reality.

A correct appraisal of the threat entails the reevaluation of enemy military capabilities aimed at NATO's southern flank, where, in general terms, two major fundamental hypotheses are present.

First: a limited scale conflict with Libya, aided by the USSR, moving toward the acquisition of local objectives proportionate to the political interests at stake. This would involve rapid, short-term actions aimed at attaining a favorable initial position, to be later followed up by a period of political negotiation. The hypothesis takes on substance when one considers that Italy has recently signed a treaty with Malta in which Italy accorded Malta "military guarantees" of which little is certain and of which many questions are left unanswered. One can imagine in fact Malta requesting that action be taken in its defense in accordance with the clauses of the treaty in order to avoid possible pressures being applied by Libya. Our navy would probably encounter no difficulty in keeping the commitment given by our minister of foreign affairs and confront Libyan naval units. However, if Soviet naval vessels patrolling the Mediterranean were to come to the aid of the Libyan units we would become involved in a conflict in which we would be the aggressors, with consequences that we do not even want to think about.

In the services' staff headquarters there are those who claim that the Soviets do not have a real amphibious capability; they can in fact count "only on 12,000 men from the five marine infantry regiments, of which only one is subordinate to the Black Sea Fleet." In particular, General Rambaldi recently stated: "To imagine what took place in the Ogaden desert could happen to Italy, when helicopter-borne troops were landed behind Somali defenses, is totally out of touch with reality. To then make reference to Afghanistan borders on the ridiculous." However, it is no mystery that throughout the peninsula and the islands there are areas suitable for airborne attacks by the seven Soviet air-transportable divisions which are readily available and deployable. (See for example the Wintex-Cimex 81 scenario-exercise that took place some months ago involving an airborne drop in the Puglie region--PANORAMA, 30 Mar 81). It is no mystery that in case of the temporary nonavailability of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, even partially as is presently the case, the USSR could attain air and naval local superiority needed for landing troops concentrated in Libya. It is no secret that the forces presently deployed throughout the peninsula and the islands are totally inadequate to meet a threat of this kind. Furthermore, there exists a worrisome lack of coordination between the Military Regions, Navy Secotrs and Air Regions, several times brought to the attention of the government, that caused a great deal of confusion during the joint operations in the center-south area hit by the earthquake.

Second: a more widespread conflict, brought about by the deterioration of the situation in the Persian Gulf would tend to degrade NATO's southern flank and result in our peninsula becoming a primary target. For an action of this kind, the USSR would have to acquire control of the Straits, making use of extremely rapid maneuvers. It is capable of carrying out operations of this sort in a successful manner, taking into account the proximity of the Black Sea bases, nearby Bulgarian territory,

vast air support capabilities and the use of navy helicopter cruisers. For operations of this kind, with Sicily as a target, the joint deployment of infantry, navy and airborne troops is standard Soviet doctrine and forms the premise for the strategic surprise, to be carried out by forces easily concentrated first in the Black Sea and then on our coasts.

(Referring again to Wintex 81, after 5 days of resistance, the use of atomic bombs would be called for on our territory in order to halt the invasion). So as not to have "our liberty and our survival dependent only and above all on a nuclear deterrent capability" it is now more than ever necessary to adopt a plan of territorial defense and regionalization of our defense, in order to shift the balance of our forces on national territory.

9209

CSO: 3104/328

PARAGRAPH ON DEFENSE IN REPORT BY INFORMATEURS

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 5 Aug 81 p 2

[Text] The Hague, August 4--Informateurs Ruud Lubbers and Jan de Koning (CDA) and Ed van Thijn (Labour), in their report to Queen Beatrix on their talks with the CDA, Labour and D'66 floor leaders, said in the defence paragraph (full text):

'As regards the conclusions on nuclear weapons and defence, the CDA floor leader proposed in his letter to remove the latest text for the programme from the conclusions.

This was a reason for us for further consideration. On the grounds of this we have decided that the following conclusions must be acceptable to all three parliamentary parties.

Conclusions on nuclear weapons and defence efforts (full text):

1. Within and outside the framework of the alliance the Netherlands will conduct an active policy aimed at security and arms control, and in particular at reducing the role of nuclear weapons.
2. To this end efforts will be made within the alliance to work for early negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear armament in Europe aimed at a mutual and substantial lowering of the armament level, in particular by reducing, if possible, abolishing, nuclear medium-range weapons; in addition a plea will be made for continuation of the SALT process.
3. The defence effort will continue to be aimed at carrying out the Dutch share in NATO's long-term defence programme.
4. As regards nuclear weapons, both the problem of medium-range weapons as that of a substantial reduction of the number of Dutch nuclear tasks, the cabinet will hold decision-making on the grounds of its own judgment. The parliamentary parties on which the cabinet is based will have a say in the decisions or the lack of decisions, also in the light of their programmes.

In the conclusion under 4 we have pointed out that although the CDA programme mentions the spring of 1981 as the time when the decision should be made, we have found that the CDA, in view of the starting date for the negotiations with the Soviet Union on this issue and in view of the necessity of careful consulta-

tions, no longer starts from this date. This view in respect of the CDA parliamentary party's decision is in line with the views of Labour and D'66, however much these parties start from a different approach on this issue, also in their programmes. Therefore no problems are to be expected on the date of December 1981 laid down in the CDA programme for the decision.

Moreover, we have purposely used the term co-deciding as regards the position of the parliamentary parties. This term has been included in the text of the programme to indicate that in their judgment the parliamentary parties will take account of their programmes as well as of the views and reasoning of their own cabinet. Since the parliamentary parties will ultimately be able to refer their own programmes, this will in any case remain a crisis-prone issue.

The cabinet view, whatever this will be, will indicate however, that a crisis on this issue should not be seen in advance as inevitable.

Finally, since the floor leaders consider a risk in this respect acceptable and since they are the first people responsible to judge this, the risk is acceptable and nothing prevents the formation of a coalition.

Thus the obstacles to proceed with the formation have been removed.' (end full text).

CSO: 3120/64

'BLACK BLOCK' TERRORISTS, SUPPLIES APPREHENDED IN FRANKFURT

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 29 Jul 81 p 3

[Article by fh.: "Several Alleged Red Army Faction Supporters Arrested"]

[Text] Frankfurt, 28 July--On Tuesday morning, at the request of FRG Attorney-General Rebmann, officials of Hesse's Land criminal police bureau, of the federal criminal police bureau and Hesse's police department searched a number of apartments in Frankfurt and the surrounding area of the city. The search measures were extensive and were directed at the members of the "Black Block" terrorist organization and took place as a result of judicial search orders. According to a spokesman for the FRG attorney general's office, "several persons" were arrested for whom warrants had been issued. In addition there were tentative arrests; evidence was secured.

According to the findings by the FRG attorney general's office, the terrorist group was formed in May 1980 under the name of "Black Block." Their goal was to support the "efforts" of the terrorist Red Army Faction. The investigating authorities are convinced that the criminal organization is responsible for the arson attack that destroyed two helicopters of the U.S. Army in Hesse's Buedingen in February of this year as well as two other arson fires; one was set in April in the Land court building in Darmstadt, the other in May in Offenbach, at the branch office of the Darmstadt attorney general's office.

According to the information released by the FRG attorney general's office, the search of the apartments of the suspected "Black Block" members on Tuesday yielded a large number of pieces of evidence, among them instructions for the building of incendiary devices and the substances required for it. The officials confiscated weapons that had been stolen during a break-in, and in addition to other evidence they found a 350-page documentation on attacks that took place last spring during the hunger strike by Red Army Faction prisoners. Furthermore, while searching a hunting lodge near Hesse's Friedberg, they found DM 10,000. The FRG attorney general asked Hesse's Land criminal police bureau to investigate the "Black Block."

According to the findings of the investigating authorities in the Rhine/Main area, members of the "Black Block" are also responsible for the senseless destruction that occurred on the fringes of the German Labor Union Federation rally that was held in May 1980 in Frankfurt. It had been the first "public appearance" of the group. In addition, members of the "Black Block" were also said to have been involved in El Salvador demonstrations that took place at the beginning of this year in Frankfurt, in peripheral disturbances during a 17 June rally in 1980 and during the 100-year

anniversary of the Frankfurt opera house in 1980. They smashed the windows of banks and stores and left behind a trail of devastation. Damages were in the millions. In the meantime, investigating authorities have come to the conclusion that the "Black Block" is composed of several autonomous groups with anarchist goals.

The spokesman for the FRG attorney general's office pointed out that there was no connection between the searches that had been ordered by the attorney general and the clearing on Tuesday morning of an area in the Frankfurt section of Nied, which had been occupied since the beginning of April. When questioned, however, he confirmed that during the peaceful evacuation seven persons were tentatively arrested because according to the findings they were suspected of being members of the "Black Block." Two of them, however, were released during the course of the day. Immediately following the action, the FRG attorney general's office emphasized that this was not related to the murder of Hesse's Minister for Economics Karry and the "revolutionary cells" that are said to be responsible for it.

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CSO: 3103/391

COST EFFECTIVENESS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY VIEWED

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Jul 81 p 13

[Article: "Increasing Cost Lead for Atomic Electric Power. Energy Economics Institute: Environmental Costs Taken Into Account"]

[Text] K.B. Bonn, 16 July--The Federal Economics Ministry is seeing its opinion confirmed that nuclear energy has a considerable cost lead. This is proved by a new study by the Energy Economics Institute at the University of Cologne. In a first evaluation of the investigative results, the ministry points out that nuclear energy--not only for base load but also partly still for intermediate load--has an increasing cost advantage over the years in comparison with electric power from hard coal. The considerable construction cost increases for nuclear power plants which are occurring in the meantime are supposed to be more than made up for by the increasing fuel costs in the hard coal power plants. The ministry considers to be particularly important the Institute's observation that electric power production costs for nuclear energy, because of their smaller fuel-dependent cost component, have over the years of operation become no longer dependent on the price evolution of fossil energies--oil, natural gas and coal. The cost of the entire fuel cycle constitutes less than 30 percent of the electric power production costs of coal powered plants, on the other hand, amounts to more than two thirds. In this comparison both environmental costs and the costs of later dismantling of the nuclear power plants are considered.

The cost advantage of nuclear energy in comparison with imported coal is estimated for power plant base load (more than 5,000 operating hours) at more than 4 pfennigs per kilowatt-hour, in comparison with domestic coal, at about 8 pfennigs. This calculation is for power plants which are going to be in operation at the end of this decade. The Association of the German Hard Coal Mining Industry says in this connection that they do not contest that nuclear energy power is less costly for base load. Hard coal has an advantage for the intermediate load. By "escalating" fuel costs over a 20 year period of operation, while only taking into consideration investment costs for power stations at purchase cost, the more capital-intensive nuclear power industry is represented by the study to have a cost advantage greater than it really is.

BROWN COAL REPLACING OIL AS ENERGY SOURCE

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Jul 81 p 17

[Article: "Brown Coal Dust Replaces Fuel Oil. The Significance of Coal Refining Is Increasing Further for Rheinbraun"]

[Text] Rheinische Braunkohlenwerke AG [Rhine Brown Coal Works, Inc.], Cologne. This subsidiary of Rheinisch-Westfaelische Elektrizitaetswerke AG [Rhine-Westphalia Electric Utility, Inc.] (RWE), which supplies about 90 percent of the brown coal produced in the FRG, will invest more than DM 1 billion in 1981. This is clearly more than in the past 5 years, when approximately DM 700 million were expended on average, chiefly for maintaining production capacity. The 1980 figure was DM 777.8 million, of which 115.2 million were expended in the Hambach surface mine, DM 28.6 million in the coal refining operations, and DM 13 million for research and development.

As can be gathered from the latest business report, the investment expenditure in the 1980's will clearly increase further. One reason for this is that, after mining the coal from the seams near the surface, Rheinbraun will have to remove ever-thicker layers (overburden) with equipment of ever-increasing capacity. Another reason is that the company wants to become still more involved in the area of coal refining. Brown coal gasification on a large technological scale is to be accomplished in this decade. In Rheinbraun's view, liquefaction of brown coal will be developed in the 1990's to the point of being ready for commercial production. Even in the past year Rheinbraun produced 1.9 million metric tons of brown coal dust, thus replacing 1 million metric tons of heavy fuel oil in the cement and lime industry.

Finally, of last year's brown coal production of 117.4 million metric tons (up by 1.2 percent), Rheinbraun supplied about 84 percent to the brown coal power plants of RWE. Mainly because of the increase in prices for almost all products, sales increased by 17 percent to DM 2.26 billion. This, however, was offset by the 16 percent increase in operating costs. Here, personnel costs--up by 13 percent--and environmental protection measures demanded by governmental authorities (up by 60 percent) stand out in particular. Since, moreover, the result of the participation turned into a deficit of DM 7.2 million following a surplus of DM 49.8 million because of the considerable losses of Union Rheinische Braunkohlen Kraftstoff AG [Union Rhine Brown Coal & Motor Fuel, Inc.], Wesseling, the net amount paid over to RWE remains unchanged at DM 52.8 million.

EXPERT DISCUSSES GEOTHERMAL ENERGY RESOURCE POTENTIAL

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 1 Jul 81 p 10-11

[Text] Gudmundur Palmason's report "Geothermal Energy in Iceland, an Estimate of Potential Resources," revealed that only 1/1000 to 2/1000 of the exploitable geothermal energy is being utilized today and only 1 to 2 percent of its exploitable electricity; this is a rough estimate. Nevertheless, geothermal energy, which is Iceland's second main energy resource, meets one-third of the country's energy consumption needs today.

Palmason's report revealed that the Geothermal Energy Department of the Energy Institute has been working on a new estimate of the geothermal energy potential. The work is well under way, and a report on the estimate is expected later this year. In addition to Palmason, the following specialists are working on this estimate: Gunnar V. Johnsen, Karl Ragnars, Gisli Karel Halldorsson, Helgi Torfason and Kristjan Saemundsson.

Estimate Guidelines

Gudmundur Palmason described in detail how this estimate was done and what guidelines it was based on. Instead of listing all the points, the following excerpt will suffice:

"In recent years attempts have been made to gauge the energy potential of geothermal areas, especially in countries in which geothermal development has a long history, such as Italy and the United States. Methods and concepts that have been used in the mining and oil industries to gauge the quantity of valuable minerals in rock formations in various areas have been used as guidelines. It is necessary, however, to take into account that geothermal energy has special characteristics to which the methods of the mining industry must be adapted. The American P. Muffler, and the Italian R. Cataldi give a detailed account of the main methods for gauging the energy potential of geothermal areas in a recent article that has been used as a reference for an estimate of geothermal energy in Iceland. The most common method consists of estimating the energy level that is below the geothermal area, based on circumference and temperature, and then estimating how much of it can be brought to the surface by injecting water through drill holes. The geothermal areas are thus mainly considered expendable reserves. Based on these guidelines, the method is simple, but it has the drawback that it does not indicate the power of the areas, i.e., how

fast the energy can be harnessed from the area. The power depends mainly on the hydrological characteristics of the rock and can only be measured in each area via drilling and flow tests. The method does not really take into account the various costs of harnessing energy, although some of its guidelines include a cost aspect. Its main points resemble Gunnar Bodvarsson's method, which he used in his initial evaluation of Icelandic high temperature areas. Both measure the size of a given energy reserve.

"In this regard, the question arises whether thermal energy should be considered a finite energy resource which is diminished as it is being used, or as a permanent resource which is renewed as soon as energy is drawn from it. According to geological standards which are measured in 10,000 or 100,000 years, geothermal energy is a permanent though a finite resource. What makes development feasible in the geothermal areas, on the other hand, especially the high temperature areas, is that a large energy supply has accumulated at relatively shallow depths in the earth over a long time, and has been carried from below in the form of watercourses. This energy supply is a mine that becomes smaller as energy is taken away from it, if the development exceeds the natural loss of energy from the area in question to the surface. The life of the reserve must be measured according to its estimated size in proportion to the thermal energy that is removed and the thermal energy that comes into it from below."

New Thermal Energy


"Thermal energy for home heating now totals close to 1,200 MW/hr, which is maximum output. Thermal energy for other uses, including electricity, can be estimated at about 500 MW/hr. All in all the thermal energy in geothermal areas is about 1,700 MW/hr. Based on the guidelines for evaluating exploitable thermal energy over a 100 year period, this corresponds to about .14 percent of the additional thermal energy that is technically exploitable. Likewise, the present electricity output from geothermal plants, which is 25 MW/e, is estimated to be about 0.4 to 1.5 percent of the technically exploitable electricity potential of thermal energy. Assuming that the Krafla powerplant were working at maximum output, the figures would be 1.2 to 4 percent.

"From this it is clear that a very small part of our geothermal energy resources are being utilized, even though thermal energy accounts for about 1/3 of the nation's total energy consumption today."

Geothermal Energy: a Greater Resource Than Previously Estimated

Palmason's article disclosed that there are 19 proven high temperature areas. Moreover, all indications are that there are nine others, although there is more uncertainty about them. The biggest high temperature area is the Torfa glacier area, which is estimated to be 140 square kilometers. Next comes the Hengill area, followed by the Krafla and the Krisuvik areas. If accessibility is not taken into account, the Grims water area is third, but it lies under a glacier and is not considered exploitable.

Palmason's conclusions indicated, among other things, that there is considerably more exploitable energy from geothermal heat than previously estimated. There are two main reasons for this. The first is that the energy reserve is now assumed to be accessible down to 3 kilometers instead of 2. The second concerns the size and number of high temperature areas, both of which have increased considerably over what was previously estimated. In addition to this, the new estimate covers the entire country, whereas the previous plans included only the high temperature areas.



The various temperatures of the rock formations in the northeast part of the country from Akureyri to Seydisfjörður, according to temperature gauges, electrical conductivity and design calculations (slightly modified). Abbreviations: Aku: Akureyri; Mor: Mork, Fnjoskadal; Fre: Fremstafell; Lax: Laxardalsheidi; K: Krafla; Aus: Austaribrekka; Gri: Grimstadir; Mod: Modrudalur; Sae: Saenutavatn; Skj: Skjoldofsstad; Hof: Hof; Egi: Egilsstadir; Sey: Seydisfjörður.

Key:

1. Surface temperature, centigrade/km
2. Temperature according to design calculations; temperatures measured at drill holes
3. Partially melted rock according to electrical conductivity calculations
4. Even temperature lines according to design calculations
5. Depth in kilometers
6. Figures on vertical lines represent electrical resistance in ohm-meters

PROGRESS ON SETTING-UP OF NUCLEAR PLANT REPORTED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 10 Jul 81 p 8

[Text] Site selection efforts for the nuclear energy power plant which the Turkish Electric Power Enterprise [TEK] is considering erecting at Sinop have been accelerated. To this end, seismic reading centers have been set up at 10 separate sites around Sinop, in the Akliman, Kurtkuyusu, Inceburun Feneri, Ertelek, Gerze, Turkeli, Boyabat, Alacam, and Gokceagac areas. It is intended that the reading centers gather information concerning earthquakes that will occur in these areas over a 6 to 8 month period...

The first requirement in site selection for building a nuclear energy power plant is that the construction site be outside the earthquake belt. In Turkey there are only two belts that fit this requirement. One of these is the region stretching from the south to Ankara and the second is the strip of coast between Sinop and Istanbul.

In the first region, Mersin-Akkuyu has been designated as the site where the First Nuclear Power Plant would be constructed. Efforts aimed at determining the site in Sinop for the second power plant, for which preliminary discussions were held with France and, before that, the Soviet Union, are under way. These efforts are being directed by Prof Dr Kazim Ergin, the director of the Earth Physics Institute of the College of Minerals at Istanbul Technical University who is also chairman of the university's Geophysics Chair. Joining Prof Ergin is a group composed of Prof Dr Nezihi Canitez, Master Geologist Ugur Guclu, Master Seismologist Zeki Uz, assistant Dr Cemil Gurbuz, and Electrical Engineer Huseyin Cansev. Meanwhile, in order to aid in site selection efforts, specialists from the Mining Research Institute are conducting studies in Sinop to produce geologic maps of the region.

The studies are being followed on site by Suphi Sahin, a deputy to the chairman of TEK's Nuclear Energy Office.

With regard to the First Nuclear Power Plant, to be set up at Akkuyu, an agreement has been arrived at with the Swedish Asea Atom Firm concerning credit for the construction of the energy power plant itself and the reactor unit. Nevertheless, the subject of financing for both construction work other than the reactor unit and fuel-enrichment procedures has not been resolved. As a result of the matter being put off for such a long time, all obligations concerning it were eliminated in November 1980.

9236

CSO: 4654/92

COMMENTARY HITS PLANS FOR DEVELOPING NUCLEAR ENERGY

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 12 Jul 81 p 5

[Text] At the same time that oil is being called "the shirt of fire," Nuclear Power Plants, which operate with processed uranium, have begun to be presented as an alternative energy source. The French, Italian, and Swiss companies trying to sell nuclear power plants to Turkey and their domestic spokesmen have started to spread the notion in the press and at conferences and meetings that nuclear power plants "are essential to break the dependence on oil in Turkey." Those who were reluctant about providing credit for Turkey's important industrial and agricultural investments and the dams it plans to construct, waste no time in promising that "they will provide large amounts of credits" when the subject turns to construction of nuclear power plants.

Dependence on Uranium

Yet in saying that setting up nuclear power plants in Turkey, which has rich water resources, will free it from dependence on oil, one implies the danger of falling into a dependence on uranium. Remarks such as "there is uranium in Turkey and so we won't be dependent" are nothing more than tall stories, because it is necessary to process the uranium used in nuclear power plants and there are only a few nations that have a monopoly on this.

Turkey's move toward nuclear power plants at a time when the cost of such a plant is not at all less than the cost of constructing a dam that would generate the same amount of energy, cannot be characterized as other than "murdering resources." That is because a dam does not stop at producing electricity. It also increases output by irrigating parched ground.

9236

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BRIEFS

UNUSED HYDROELECTRIC POTENTIAL--While oil imports swallow up all of Turkey's export income, 65 billion cubic meters of water flow unused in all parts of Turkey. The sighs expressed for the foreign currency that oil burned off, coincide and fade with the sound of 65 billion cubic meters of water which flow along without being used in any manner as an energy source. In other words, as the water flows, the Turk watches. It is being stated that if Turkey, which today can take advantage of only 10 percent of its 72 billion cubic meters of water resources, accelerated dam construction, this ratio could rise to 55 percent within 9 years and to 100 percent within 20 years. This would concurrently "lighten" the load of oil, which accounts for 48 percent of all energy consumption, and "increase the load" for hydroelectric energy, which accounts for a 7.5 percent share. Completion of the 6 dams now under construction will not by itself reverse the negative effects of the energy problem on the economy. By means of the irrigation which the Karakaya Dam will bring to the Harran plain, an increase in wheat production alone from today's 17 million ton level to nearly 30 million tons may be realized. [Text] [Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 12 Jul 81] 9236

CSO: 4654/92

TRADE DEFICIT WITH EEC REPORTED

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 7-13 Aug 81 p 8

[Text]

More than 50% of the island's trade deficit (£236.2 m) last year was incurred in trade with the EEC countries and amounted to £131.5 m., the official report "Analysis of Foreign Trade 1980" says.

Italy headed the list (£45.8 m. imports, £2.4 m. exports, leaving a trade deficit of £43.4 m.) followed by West Germany with an adverse trade balance of £27.2 m. and the U.K. (£26.5 m.).

Trade with the UK last year was: Exports £38.9 m., imports £65.4 m.).

Cyprus showed a surplus in her trade with the Arab countries amounting to £39 m. (exports £92.4 m. imports £53.4 m.).

The report notes, however, that Iraq and Sudan contributed negatively to the island's trade balance because they supplied oil to Cyprus valued at £46.7 m.

Lebanon topped the list of Arab countries absorbing Cyprus exports (worth £18.6 m.) followed by Libya (£15.5.), Saudi Arabia (£14.4 m.) and Syria (£12.7 m.).

The trade gap with the Eastern Trade Area increased slightly last year and reached £20.6 m. compared with £17.9 m. in 1979.

In the group of "other countries," Japan topped the list with a negative trade deficit for Cyprus amounting to £29.7 m. It was followed by Greece (£25 m.) and the United States (£22.8 m.).

The report says all categories of imports showed increases, with fuels and lubricants heading the list. Their value reached £78.5 m., up 76.6% over the previous year.

Car imports reached £14.5 m. as against £9.6 m. in 1979.

Total civil imports stood at £424.3 m. while exports amounted to £188 m. Agricultural exports, mainly potatoes and citrus fruit, reached £41.3 m.

Manufactured articles, mainly clothing and footwear, registered a marked increase of over 27% and amounted to £46.2 m. as against £36.3 m. the previous year. They accounted for 51% of the total value of domestic exports.

The UK continued to occupy, as in previous year, the first place both in imports as well as in exports, with 15.4% and 20.7% of the total respectively.

COMPETITION HITS GRAPE EXPORTS, LOSSES EXPECTED

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 1 Aug 81 p 4

[Text] Limassol, July 31--Severe losses, estimated at many thousands of pounds, are feared by the Cyprus grape exporters on account of cut-throat competition among themselves in foreign markets, particularly the British market which is the main outlet for fresh grapes.

The competition follows the increased quantity of grapes agreed by Cyprus exporters for daily discharge at the London docks from steamers loaded by them jointly, but for separate account. The quantity was fixed at 500 tons as against 400 tons last year.

"This has proved catastrophic," said Mr Stamatis Mavropoulos, the leading fresh grapes exporter, who has been in the business for years, and has the largest share of the annual grape exports.

"The quantity should instead be reduced to 300 tons daily," he added, "in view of the recession in Britain, otherwise the quantity cannot be easily absorbed by the UK market. And this really happened," he continued, "with the arrival in Britain of the second shipment of 2,165 tons per m.s. "Satsuna."

The result was that the Cyprus exporters whose number was increased by newcomers, entered into keen competition among themselves in their frantic efforts to dispose of their grapes, offering the same product under eight different brand names, and cutting prices from 50p to 25p per lb."

Loss

"Already," Mr Mavropoulos said, "there is a loss of 25/- per tray from this steamer, at the current sale prices, and no improvement is anticipated with the two further shipments of 1918 tons per M.S. "Smara" and 222 tons per M.S. "Rosemary," now afloat.

"On the contrary," he added, "the situation will get worse, as almost the whole shipment aboard M.S. "Rosemary" will come under the increased import tariff of 22%, being in excess of the quantity of 7,000 tons, enjoying the reduced tariff rate (about 8%), which entered the UK by July 31st."

Mr Mavropoulos said that Cyprus grapes met with competition from Chile at the start of the season, but this did not last for long, and the first shipment of 1711 tons, per m.s. "Western Reefer" on July 13 from Limassol, was easily disposed of as were the small lots of air shipments.

Mr Mavropoulos dwelt on the importance of protecting the grape export business. "which is not an easy enterprise for everyone."

Safeguards

"We need professional safeguards," he said, "and I have placed this matter before the Minister of Commerce and Industry for consideration." "The number of grape exporters," he added, "is too high, and this will mean destruction of the trade, as the same product entering the market at the same time is offered for sale from various sources, fighting each other to secure the business."

Mr Mavropoulos acknowledged the advantage of joint shipments of grapes by Cyprus exporters to regulate supplies to the foreign markets--which sometimes might be overburdened by Cyprus grapes--but said this advantage is counterbalanced by the increased number of shippers in one and the same steamer, each striving to sell for his own account.

The total exports of grapes, mostly seedless "sultana" type, are expected to reach 14,000 tons, with a final shipment due early next month, of which 11,500 are for Britain and 2,500 for Scandinavia and Holland--550 tons to Finland (M.S. "Ariel"--and 1,800 tons to Holland and Sweden (M.S. "Vosges").

Prices paid to producers were 15 to 20% higher than last year's--reaching 10/- per oke for early season sultanas--and there was about the same increase in the labour costs (collection, packing, transport, loading etc.)

CSO: 4600/133

KIEL INSTITUTE FAULTS TRADE DEFICIT FOR WEAK CURRENCY

Bonn DIE WELT in German 16 Jul 81 p 7

/Report by Hans-J. Mahnke, Bonn/

/Text/ The cyclical changes in the D-mark:U.S.dollar exchange rate are determined --within a 2 months delay--by the development of the inflation differential between the FRG and the United States, the ups and downs of the American balance of payments, and the amount of the current account balance in both countries. A study by the Kiel Institute for World Economy shows that exchange rates have tended in the average of the period since July 1974 to react more violently to balance of payments than surpluses. Psychological reasons are said to be primarily responsible.

The institute therefore ascribes the main cause of the current D-mark weakness to the large deficit in German balance of payments. The deficit is said to have raised expectations of a D-mark devaluation. This was compounded by the fact that the United States current account is in balance, and interest rates there are extremely high. The notable advantage enjoyed by the FRG as regards stability was not able to balance any of this.

"Bundesbank interventions on the foreign exchange market are obviously not always successful and often affect the exchange rate in an undesirable direction," the study continues. When the Bundesbank supports the D-mark, the impression tends to arise on the foreign exchange market that the D-mark is even weaker than assumed. In the short run this may mean that D-mark investments are discarded in favor of U.S.dollar investments--to the extent of overcompensating the direct dollar sales by the Bundesbank.

Political events normally determine expectations on the foreign exchange market for a short time only.

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CSO: 3103/385

UNEASINESS OVER BUNDESBANK PROFITS

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 10 Jul 81 pp 8-9

/Text/ The Bundesbank is about to record the largest profit in its history. However, uneasiness instead of general satisfaction prevails with regard to the unexpected monetary blessing.

It seems Germans no longer enjoy anything. This year the Frankfurter Bundesbank is likely to record DM10 billion profits. They arise mainly from the fact that, by way of money creation, the Bundesbank obtains interest bearing instruments without itself having to pay interest on central bank money. And yet it appears that nobody is really pleased with the billion blessing.

Some fear that the Bundesbank profits may obstruct the lowering of the rate of inflation, others that the urgently required reduction in public budget deficits may be further postponed consequent on the billions from Frankfurt.

The reason? A sizable chunk of the money belongs to the state. Article 27 of the Bundesbank law provides that the bank's net profits are distributed: 20 percent but no less than DM20 million must be paid into the statutory reserve until this reserve amounts to 5 percent of note circulation. Incidentally, the statutory reserve as of now is still DM2.5 billion short of this upper limit. Ten percent of the profit may be used for other reserves, DM30 million more are to be used to redeem equalization claims. The remainder is payable to the Federal Government.

Bonn can do without tax revenues to the extent of the Bundesbank profits paid over to the Federal Government. If the Bundesbank earns a surplus of DM10 billion this year and pays 70 percent to the Federal Government, this amounts to DM7 billions of relief--corresponding to 7-8 percent of the value added tax. At the same time we must remember that this is not just a book profit but a "genuinely" earned amount.

Moreover, in addition to the net interest received the Bundesbank will also record a profit from the appreciation of its foreign exchange reserves. As per the corporation law Bundesbank foreign exchange reserves are shown in the balance sheet in accordance with the lowest value principle. Should the U.S.dollar maintain its present level or thereabouts until the end of the year, the dollar flowing into Bundesbank accounts in 1981 will not be valued at the current and relatively low valuation of DM1.72 to the dollar but at the all-in buying rate which is well above this mark. Though, in contrast to a surplus arising from current business, this

higher valuation is initially a book profit only (actually it does not make all that great a difference in view of the large amount of dollars already held), it does not benefit from any special treatment as per the Bundesbank law, and some of it must therefore also be paid over to the Federal Government.

In principle payments of Bundesbank profits do not represent a danger to price stability as long as the total growth of the central bank money supply does not exceed the extent appropriate to stability, in other words proceeds along the same lines as the growth rate of the economy's production potential. On the other hand, when additional central bank money enters the circulation by the payment of Bundesbank profits to the Federal Government, and the latter uses it to finance spending, the scope for other types of money creation narrows (for instance in the area of open market, bank rate and minimum reserve policies).

Let us assume that next year the Bundesbank will aim for a similar growth in the central bank money supply as it did this year (roughly 5.5 percent); this would work out as a rise in the 1982 central bank money supply to some DM9 billion. Given payments to the Federal Government in the amount of DM 5.5-6 billion (and the current budget planning is based on such an amount), this would mean that the major part of the money supply expansion would take place by way of Bundesbank profit transfers. Up to now, on the other hand, the expansion of the central bank money supply has proceeded mainly by way of the acquisition of claims on foreign institutions or domestic banks.

Not that such a change would offer unsurmountable difficulties. It would be important, though, for the Bundesbank profits to be fed relatively steadily into the circulation in the course of the year. The necessary understanding between Finance Minister Hans Matthoefer and Bundesbank chief Karl Otto Poehl (both residents of Kronberg/Taunus) would be quite easily achieved.

When the Bundesbank pays its profits earned to the Federal Government, it contributes to the reduction of the Bonn budget deficit. To the extent that the Federal Government obtains additional revenues thereby, it may forego either tax increases or spending cuts. On the other hand it may use this money to repay new indebtedness more rapidly than planned. It cannot, therefore be asserted that the Bundesbank profit transfer obstructs the consolidation of federal finances. If the profit transfer is used further to reduce new indebtedness, it will actually help consolidation.

It is impossible to forecast with any certainty in how far the Federal Government will be able in future to count on payments of Bundesbank profits. Uncertainty prevails especially with regard to the yields of the foreign exchange reserve held by the Bundesbank. Actually the foreign currency risk could be lessened if the Bundesbank were to more resolutely reduce its foreign currency holdings and, instead of dollar claims on the American Government, purchase debt instruments of its own government. This would lessen the fluctuations in Bundesbank profits caused by exchange rate movements, and the Federal Government could count on steady and more easily anticipated relief.

SOCIAL INSURANCE EXPENDITURES, STATISTICS PUBLISHED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 23 Jun 81 p 4

[Text] Social insurance expenditures will reach the sum of 181.8 billion drachmas this year, which raises the percentage of increase in this sector to 169.73 per cent during the last 4 years.

This change is due to the increased commitment on the part of the State, to the number of people insured and pensioned by the insurance organizations, and to the institutional regulations which have been made during this period.

The above was stressed yesterday by the deputy minister of social services, Ger. Apostolatos, as he delivered over the 1981 social budget to the journalists.

Of the 296.2 billion drachmas which are provided for the sector of social protection for 1981, 181.8 billion will be spent by the insurance organizations under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Services. This compares to 140.074 billion drachmas which had been disposed of in 1980 and 67.4 billion drachmas spent in 1977.

From a study of the tables on the social budget which are being published, it follows that the expenditure for social protection in 1981 is 2.5 times larger than that of 1977 and 31.5 times larger than the 1961 expenditure. Correspondingly, the expenditure of the insurance organizations for 1981 is 2.75 times greater than the 1977 expenditure and 38.2 times larger than the corresponding expenditure of 1961.

The chief regulations which have contributed to this increase, said Apostolatos, are the following:

- The establishment of the 35-year period in the private sector
- The founding of the large Salaried Employees Auxiliary Insurance Fund
- The institution of the automatic adjustment of IKA [Social Insurance Foundation] pensions
- The extending of IKA coverage throughout the country
- The completion of extending medical and hospital protection to new and large groups of insured and pensioned persons

- The bringing of the entire economically active population under insurance coverage
- The significant improvement of minimum pensions
- The upgrading, for insurance purposes, of older IKA pensioners by three insurance categories
- The instituting of effective contributions and grants
- The abolition of a number of irritating insurance provisions of an antisocial nature
- The administrative and financial reforming of the large occupational funds
- The tripling of farmers' pensions during the last 4 years
- The granting of a separate pension to the farmer's spouse
- Insurance against losses from floods and wind storms for the agricultural produce and livestock of our farmers
- The merging of the small funds
- Insurance coverage for the hundreds of thousands of Greek workers in third countries
- The implementation of machine accounting at the insurance funds
- The National Insurance Register
- The simplification of pensioning procedures
- The combined certification and collection of the revenues of the insurance organizations
- Financial support for the large occupational funds
- The carry-over of insurance from the public to the private sector.

Finally, these regulations also provide for:

- a) Coverage in the Greek insurance system for all expatriate Greeks, and
- b) The insuring of all the country's uninsured people of advanced age.

The social budget, with a preface by Minister Sp. Doxiadis and Deputy Ministers Ger. Apostolatos and Ath. Tsoukandas, shows the amounts which are being allocated for social protection and for insurance, health, and public relief for the Greek people by way of the special budgets of the Ministry of Social Services, the insurance organizations, the hospital institutions, the social welfare institutions, and so forth.

For the year 1981 the social budget shows revenues of 317.557 billion drachmas and expenditures of 296.207 billion drachmas, with a surplus of about 21 billion drachmas.

A percentage of 91.94 percent will be allocated for social insurance, 4.74 percent for health, 2.74 percent for relief, and a percentage of 0.58 percent will cover general expenses.

Pensions

The number of agencies under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Services which are involved in social insurance coverage are: 33 for basic insurance, 61 for auxiliary insurance, 54 for sickness, 63 for relief, and 61 mutual-aid funds.

The number of people insured for basic pensioning is 3,494,782 people, for auxiliary pensions 966,251, for sickness 4,485,381, and for relief 490,922 people.

The total number of people receiving pensions from these agencies comes to 1,104,256 persons, with those receiving auxiliary-insurance pensions numbering 194,942 people.

Finally, 196,981 persons are State pensioners.

During the last 4 years, the percentages by which pensions increased have turned out to be double the increase which was seen in the cost of living, Apostolatos said.

More specifically concerning the IKA, the maximum pension shows an increase of 160 percent (16,958 drachmas - 44,117) and the minimum pension shows an increase of 137 percent (3,800 - 9,000). For the TEVE [Greek Craftsmen's and Tradesmen's Fund] the increase is 211 percent for the maximum pension (18,700 drachmas) and 190 percent for the minimum (6,000 drachmas). For the OGA [Farm Insurance Organization] the increase is 200 percent for both the maximum and minimum pension.

In this connection, Deputy Minister Apostolatos said that the cost-of-living index in the period 1977-1981 came to 94.8 percent, and that if the cost-of-living adjustment of pensions were put into effect--as was promised by Papandreou--with the present consumer price index, this 94.8 percent would be used as the basis, and consequently it would give a much lower percentage than the increases in pensions which have been given already.

It is stated that in the 1981 social budget 178.622 billion drachmas represents the sum for pension grants. Of this amount, 133.104 billion will be covered by social insurance agencies, 41.450 billion by the State, and 4.068 billion by the insurance services.

Provisions for sickness grants are 53.116 billion, for relief grants 16.893 billion, for unemployment benefits 5.693 billion, and for family allowances 5.835 billion.

In addition, a sum of 5.981 billion drachmas has been claculated for grants of lump-sum benefits by the social-insurance agencies which come under the Ministry of Social Services, as compared to 4.717 billion in 1980.

Finally, in responding to questions by journalists, Apostolatos said that the IKA budget for this year comes to 100 billion drachmas, and that the liabilities for this amount come to a percentage of only 2 percent per year.

He said further that studies are being done on establishing better controls on the reserves of the insurance agencies, which come to 108.299 billion drachmas.

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CSO: 4621/22

ROUNDTABLE ON REGIONAL ROLE IN AGRICULTURE POLICY

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 9 Jul 81 Supplement pp 4-5

[Text] The regions' role in agricultural policy in Italy has become a fact to be reckoned with. The time has come to design the instruments for their operations, while steering clear of the evil temptations of regionalist neo-centrism. This new relationship is a promising one that must be carefully tended.

Italy's agriculture is in deep trouble: and that certainly is nothing new. Each month, at least, news stories consequent upon that trouble burst upon us in ever more troublesome terms, covering the front pages of all the media: the laborious negotiations with the European Economic Community -- under fire from Italian farmers for pursuing what they term a policy of privilege toward Northern European farmers -- which set off imposing demonstrations by farmers and their organizations, big as well as small. Then came the public's "discovery" that the second biggest item in our balance of trade deficit is food: more than 6 trillion lire a year flow out of the country to pay for food products ranging all the way from grain to meat. And finally came the dizzying rise in farm prices, which have already climbed so far as to make fruits and vegetables, for instance, luxury items that weigh heavy indeed in the Italian family shopping basket.

What we need is a farm policy worthy of the name, people are saying on every side: one that can deal with and manage the restructuring so necessary in so vital a sector of the economy. More specifically, as Manlio Rossi Doria pointed out in a recent debate in Rome, what is missing among the governing classes in Italy is an awareness of the importance of a sector like this, almost always downgraded as one merely marginal to the Italian economy, whose crisis or actual extinction would not, after all, be such a dire threat to the nation's economy: "We can buy whatever farm products we need abroad out of the profits of our industrial products."

Then, at the beginning of the Seventies, a new source of initiative and political and administrative management appeared on the scene: the regions. The legislation that brought these governments into existence foresaw broad powers for them, precisely in the field of agriculture; so sweeping were those powers that the ministry was given as its almost

exclusive mission the assignment of coordinating and guiding the formulation of those policies.

It is now more than 10 years since the regions came into being, and we have sat down together at this roundtable to assess the regions' capacity to be the true protagonists of a new agricultural policy; the adequacy of the machinery at their disposal, and the soundness and efficacy of decentralization as it stands today. Not forgetting -- in fact raising it as the central issue -- the pattern of relationships between the regions and the farm organizations and the kind of participatory opportunities provided for all those interested in the formulation of an agricultural policy that takes regional specificities into account.

Taking part in this roundtable discussion is Bruno Ferraris, who since 1975 has been the Piedmont Region's councilman for agriculture. Senator Fabio Fabbri is serving his second term as undersecretary at the Agriculture Ministry. Lastly, we have the three top executives of the farmers' organizations: Giandomenico Serra, president of Confagricultura, the organization that traditionally represents agribusiness, but some small farmers as well. Arcangelo Lo Bianco is president of Coldiretti, the biggest of the farm organizations, directly sponsored by the Christian Democrat Party, although President Lo Bianco aims at making his tenure one of markedly less intimate ties with Piccoli's party. Giuseppe Avolio is president of Confcoltivatori, born a few years ago of the merger of all the historically left-leaning farm organizations.

We gave the floor first to Councilman Ferraris.

Ferraris: Whenever the regions take action in agriculture, they are affected by the EEC and by the national government: the regions have felt the impact of both. As for the national level, the first hard fact we encounter is the lack of planning, to the point where the intent of the "Quadrifoglio" [four-fold agricultural law] is not reflected in the food and agriculture plan, which has not yet even been sent to Parliament, nor yet in the region-by-region breakdown of production targets, as it should have been under PL 894. The same shortfall must be put into the record in the distribution and allocation of funds, which has fallen far short of remedying long-standing inequities. And then there is one last and perhaps the worst of all restrictions, which stems from Parliament which, even after the statutory institution of the regions, keeps turning out laws and petty statutes which totally ignore the existence of regional governments.

AVANTI!: What is your view of the regions' rapport with the government over the past several years?

Ferraris: Adequate, on the whole, even though there is still some gear-grinding on legislation, with the issuance of circulars which the ministers perhaps don't even bother to read, but which throw up daily roadblocks for the regions to clamber over. In spite of all this, I think the regions have moved vigorously, fulfilling their own programs, and

at the same time implementing Community directives, in line with the way we have implemented the "Quadrifoglio."

AVANTI: But are the regions actually managing to get anywhere with their efforts to be the locomotive force for a regional farm policy, or are they doomed to lose ground -- after all the high hopes of the Seventies -- and slide back into the role of peripheral outposts of the ministry?

Ferraris: The fact is that there are those who would like to see the regions turn into a shapeless appendage of the Agriculture Ministry. The facts, though, are there to show that this has not happened.

AVANTI: What sort of rapport does the Regional Council have with the farmers' organizations, with Confagricoltura, Coldiretti, and Confcoltivatori?

Ferraris: The rapport is a good one, with all three organizations (aside of course from some fairly noisy demonstrations mounted by Coldiretti...) and we have worked out agreements with them in relation both to our programs and to drafting of legislative proposals, for example the bill covering producers/growers' associations, drafted after seminars with the farmers' associations.

Lo Bianco: Coldiretti was among the most ardent supporters of regional autonomy, in line with our tradition of strengthening local governments. We believed in it because of the access for participation in regional policymaking this new instrument could open to farmers. Today, though, we have to voice a few complaints: from the early regionalist euphoria we have fallen into a sterile exchange of insults between the regions and the central government, which has had unfortunate consequences. And another thing: it seems to me that we have paid too much attention to managing what is there, and not enough to carving out a permanent place for the regions in the national and territorial planning processes. Again: the confrontation between economic sectors and between regions has somehow failed to lead to the drafting of development plans. The unseemly scramble for appropriations seems to me a highly debatable approach, one in which regional councilmen have not displayed any command of the attitudes required for planning at the national level. And then there is the endless quarrel with the European Economic Community: as of right now we have twenty different regional policies, each of them beating its own regional drum to tout its products abroad. And then we have these same individual regions eager to take a direct hand in forming Community policy, at the risk of dissipating the unity of Italian policy within the EEC. This does not seem to me to be a good thing. To obviate this state of affairs the Agriculture Ministry has made it a practice to consult with regional councilmen on the eve of major EEC negotiations. The Interministerial Commission for Farm and Food Planning (CIPAA) was designed for this specific purpose, but it has turned out to be a dismal failure...

Ferraris: It is true that the government has consulted us recently. But that has not been going on long, though: before, Marcora used to consult us after the fact -- let's say he would inform us...

Fabbri: Actually, we have come down to the day of reckoning, because now we can look at the bottom lines of regional accomplishments at some remove from the excessively regionalistic or excessively federalist and anti-autonomist emotions of the early days. Our job is to see how to straighten out the faults of the central government, and those of the periphery as well. The ministry's job is to provide the link for planning and policy coordination. So the regions are wrong when they try to usurp functions which properly belong to the central government or when they set up agencies or structures of their own that used to be the province of the ministry. But if the regions, as Lo Bianco alleges, often give the impression of shattering the united front of Italian policy abroad, it is because the central government was negligent in taking the proper steps first: if the central government's agencies do not concern themselves with projecting an image of Italian products abroad, then clearly the regions are going to step into the breach, with whatever funds they can scrape together. Now is the time to get out of this winter of discontent and to replace it with a season of understanding. That means we shall have to lay hands on the shortcomings in the law: for one thing, the "Quadrifoglio" has got to be amended, because it simply doesn't work the way it is. The CIPAA, furthermore, merely institutionalizes the segregation of agriculture from the rest of the economy: we socialists have long been saying that this situation calls for urgent remedy. Elsewhere, there are areas in which the regions have yet to take the place they ought to have taken: the relations between production and market, the area of consumer education, that of restoring balance. They would rather, in other words, sit and sift through the resources that flow from the center instead of channeling them into the sectors to which they have assigned priority.

AVANTI: But are you satisfied with the current level of coordination and consultation among regions, farmers' organizations, and the Agriculture Ministry?

Fabbri: Maybe the councilmen are called in too often, but there is the argument that most of those meetings go unattended and decisions are not taken. In any event, the rapport between the regions and the ministry is vital and what we need to do is repair and reorder the current machinery that controls it.

Serra: I believe that farm policy in Italy has special features that make it more difficult to handle than in any other country, because there is not just one level of authority here--there are three: the Community level, the national level, and lastly the regional level, which is very important, since the laws made under delegated power have given almost exclusive authority to the regions. So if we are to achieve the goals we have set ourselves, each of these levels must impose limitations on itself so as to prevent persistent paralyzing conflict. Given this state of affairs, what cash-crop farmers are complaining about is the fact that in Italy -- and it is certainly not the regions that are to blame -- there has never yet been a consistent, coherent farm policy, thanks to layer upon layer of countless mini-policies. Similarly, we must reluctantly admit that the effort to fit a standard program with specific objectives into national farm policy has run up against its roadblock precisely in the implementation of the

approach that gave rise to the "Quadrifoglio," which was unquestionably a step in the right direction. Now, getting back to the subject of self-imposed limitations, I believe that now, more than 10 years after the regions were established, they have had adequate time for breaking in and shakedown cruising to be able to operate effectively without meddling in community policy, precisely to avoid the kind of continued adversary stance I was talking about just now. I also believe that there can be no farm policy in Italy in the absence of other policies: industrial processing, marketing of farm products, and export policy. For this same reason, farm policy cannot be purely regional: it is unthinkable that there should be feuds between regions over issues that must be centrally coordinated and settled. As for the regions' strictly "production-boosting" exercises, I must make one remark: they made the worst possible experiment when they provided unlimited incentives to certain kinds of cooperative patterns, not for development and advancement, but simply to consolidate the losses stemming from unsatisfactory economic management. In this sector again, we must respect certain forms of competition between enterprises of disparate dimensions -- without artificial intervention.

Fabbri: Just a few remarks: on the matter of planning through collaboration among regions, I must say that when the "Quadrifoglio" was first launched, there were those who criticized that approach and pushed instead for the idea of polycentric planning, as Giorgio Ruffolo calls it. On the basis of experience, we must conclude today that we should be moving along that road. Second remark: foreign trade and support for exports. The government before this one had drafted legislation that brought in the regions and the national consortia, including the development agencies, into a policy of support for food exports. Another remark: in the medium-term plan, the chapter on agriculture has yet to be written. In this sphere, input from the regions cannot be ignored.

Ferraris: You said, quite rightly, that the whole thing has yet to be written...

Fabbri: Lastly, I should like to call attention to the need for considering an extraordinary maneuver to mobilize all resources appropriated for agriculture and not yet committed, including Community resources. I am referring to the resources of the regions, of the Mezzogiorno Fund, and of the state ("Quadrifoglio" and others): there are billions lying idle in those tills that could turn out to be decisive today, if we could manage to get from the appropriations stage to that of investment.

Avolio: I must congratulate Councilman Ferraris on his frankness and honesty in showing us all the bright and dark places in the regions' agricultural activities. A lot of people are wondering if the regional experiment is working in agriculture or whether what we have here is an instrument which, for better or for worse, is there and which must therefore be made to work so as to do the least harm. The lawmakers were thinking straight when they assigned important responsibilities in agricultural policy to the regions. Today, while we all see the need for some coordination in regional policies, we feel an equally urgent

need for the elaboration of measures and provisions that truly embody the diversity we see in the various regions of our country. There is hence no contradiction between the need for a regional agrarian policy and national coordination among those policies, which for one thing could discourage the resurgence -- here and there -- of regional chauvinism. In short, what we need is a national farm policy that is regionally articulated, to respond to differing requirements; this is one way to give regional individuality a voice of its own, even at the community level.

As for the role of the regions, I have already mentioned the bright and dark patches that have marked their activities. But these bodies have had to operate in the teeth of two sources of uncertainty: uncertainty as to jurisdiction, and uncertainty as to implementation, by which I mean the means and the structures for achieving their goals. These are uncertainties, however, which I think are on the road to oblivion. We now have PL 382, which entrusted broad jurisdiction to the regions, and at the implementation level there is a lot more clarity now.

Lastly, I would caution the regions against the error of separating agriculture from the rest of the economy; if they fall into that trap, they will merely be perpetuating the ghetto status of agriculture as embodied with the establishment of the CIPAA. I was the only one -- at the national conference held at FAO headquarters in Rome -- to vote against this principle! We really must get behind this effort -- although I must emphasize that we are a lot closer to agreement than we ever were in the past -- involving the farmers' organizations, the regions, and the Agriculture Ministry.

Fabbri: I almost always agree with Avolio and I should like to underscore the importance of the regions' planning functions, of planning from the bottom up, as provided in article 11 of presidential decree 616, although the regions have not yet fully implemented it, too often falling prey to regional neocentralism, even when it comes to planning.

Serra: Before the regional councilman responds to that, I should like to hand him two little needles: I have my doubts that we shall get anywhere with decentralizing this or that function from the regional to a lower level without an adequate like move from the national level. In other words, it would be well to offset the risks of overly disparate decentralization from region to region, such as we have already seen in the case of Tuscany in relation to situations elsewhere. To do so would constitute a splintering of responsibility damaging to the execution of regional intervention. I should also like to point out that hitherto the regions have taken scant notice of a basic point: I am talking of the national aspect, or if you will experiments with chances for alternative sources of income -- particularly in the problem zones in the mountains and foothills -- or perhaps I should say additional sources, such as those that might be derived from an expansion of farm vacations and rural tourism.

Avolio: Serra gets a raise: it would be a good thing if the regions were to step up the process of delegating some of their prerogatives to

other governmental agencies, particularly in matters of management and not in merely creating more sources of farm policy. Then there is the starting line of planning: land use, its proper utilization, husbanding farmlands as the inalienable patrimony of the nation. There are farmlands, among the most fertile in the world, that have been diverted to other uses: and we piously deplore the state of our agriculture! And then there is the link between agriculture and industry, strengthened by the buildup in what is commonly known as agribusiness.

Lo Bianco: I believe that when we talk about regions, we ought to be somewhat rueful about our failure to perceive -- because we were always too busy with day-to-day business -- the regions' potential in relation to the state of the nation and the link between agriculture and the other sectors of the economy. At the regional level, we could have got a little more done than the centralist national capacity could do alone. What we have to avoid is the spread to the regional level as well of the government-intervention culture that has permeated the national level, beyond the bounds, that is, of any inter-sectoral logic and beyond the bounds of a healthy balance among the sectors of the economy. Then I should like to take up the problem of the structure of several regional agencies: let's take the agricultural development agencies. These were supposed to be the homefront managers of farm policy, as protagonists, but their internal makeup heavily penalizes the farm labor organizations. What do we expect them to become, like this? Maybe they ought to replace the people who used to be ministry inspectors, or its secular arms, or maybe a connecting link among the farm organizations?

Ferraris: I have been listening to your remarks and I think that a good deal of what you say might prove useful to those of our colleagues who read the transcript of this roundtable. Let's begin with the twenty regional policies: I agree with Avolio, but the problem is to get a national farm policy that is part of a consistent economic policy, except that there has never been one (and CIPAA did its share to see that there never would be one...). In the medium-term plan -- and I am glad Fabbri thinks so too -- there is no mention of agriculture. So it is obvious, then, that regional policies must be made to mesh with the national plan, because I, over in Piedmont, cannot simply copy what they're doing in Emilia... In my region I have to keep constantly tugging the sleeves of the rest of the council to remember that there is a link between agriculture and industry.

The same issue of restoring national balance comes up in every region in different ways, varying in breadth as well as in articulation. Once again, the problem is that there truly be a national policy, that the regions will have to articulate it in various ways and tailored to local realities. I agree that the problem is to avoid the centralism that has typified the national level, so much so that when I was elected to the council in 1975 I immediately pushed a law through in which I vested all functions in the farm inspectors, and, to change something while I was waiting for the transfer of authority I set up commissions to decentralize and streamline the job. But now we need to get down to the genuine transfer of authority.

Management, though, must be kept separate from planning. In Piedmont we started with planning for the major sectors and then we began a process of local development planning, at the zone level: I hope that by October we can have the initial summary documents, and that we can use them to tie in with our management of public intervention.

I am still for PL 984, which was a step forward, even though we have to redefine some of its aspects and make it less rigid. Another issue is the matter of promotion, and of the charges various regional undertakings have evoked. The top level of promotion is the regional one, and there can be no argument about that, except for the fact that it must be tied in with nutrition information and education. Then there is large-scale national and international promotion: certainly such efforts detached from others in the regions are pitiable. But the problem is to coordinate the regional agencies with the national ones.

I should like, however, to dwell for a moment on the basic issue of land use, of protection for farmland as such. It is partly a cultural problem: even the most enlightened city planners have sometimes failed to give proper consideration to the conservation of land for farm use. And so we, as the Piedmont Region, have come up with a tool that seemed to us absolutely essential for this purpose: a soil map that would let everybody see what kind of utilization is appropriate.

I shall stop now, but in closing I want to raise an issue for you here today: I mean the crisis in state intervention, the freeze on investments due to the dwindling supply of farm credit, which is fast disappearing.

Avolio: I believe we are all agreed on that count, and that stems from scant attention to farm problems on the part of the politicians, and of the press as well. We, as Confcoltivatori, propose that agriculture be made the target of a flow of investments at least matching agriculture's contribution to the gross internal product.

Lo Bianco: We have written this into a bill in Coldiretti's caucus in Parliament, tailoring it to match the formulation unanimously approved by the National Council on Labor and the Economy (CNEL).

Serra: But the real reason why farm credit has dried up is that inflation has topped 20 percent: in a situation like this, any kind of investment in agriculture has become impossible, even for the best-run operation. Even so, until inflation is brought under control, we must lower the cost of credit before we embark on regional intervention: hence our request for an international loan with a guaranteed exchange rate which the government must provide, because this would let us get the cost of money down to 15 percent, and thus enable the regions to use their share of loan assistance eligibility in a less "stingy" fashion.

Without this, once there is no longer any such thing as self-financing, nor yet any investment when money costs 25 percent, we truly stand in peril of a recession of horrendous proportions in agriculture. Farmers bought less fertilizer this year, for instance: there isn't even money to finish out the year.

POLL SHOWS MAJORITY RECOGNIZE NEED TO LOWER BUYING POWER

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 31 Jul 81 p 6

[Text] Some 62 percent of those asked said they are willing to reduce their own buying power a few percentage points if that will help to guarantee work for everyone. This was shown by an opinion poll carried out for ARBEIDERBLADET by the Norwegian Opinion Institute.

There were 25 percent who said they were not willing to accept such a reduction and 13 percent were not sure.

Willingness to reduce their own buying power to guarantee employment is greatest among supporters of the Christian People's Party with 68 percent expressing willingness to go along with such a reduction. According to the opinion poll a disinclination to accept a lower buying power seems most widespread among Conservative sympathizers--59 percent said they would go along with such a reduction while 31 percent said they would not.

Among Labor Party supporters 64 percent said they were willing to relinquish a few percentage points of their buying power while 22 percent said they were not.

Incidentally the opinion poll showed small geographic variations in responses. But there is a tendency for people living in the four northernmost counties to be more willing to reduce their buying power for the sake of employment while there is less willingness to do so in the Oslo/Akershus area.

The question asked in the poll went like this: "Are you willing to reduce your buying power (real income) a few percentage points if this would help guarantee work for everyone?" The poll was conducted in June.

LO [Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions] chairman Tor Halvorsen told the Labor Press Office that the opinion poll expressed attitudes corresponding to priorities set by LO. "We have always had work for everyone as our superordinate goal. The poll shows this priority has broad support among the people.

"In preparing our tariff demands we have made full employment considerations the most important goal, something the union movement will continue to do," Halvorsen said.

But at the same time he stressed that he saw no contradiction between guaranteeing employment and maintaining stable buying power. "The level of buying power affects domestic demand. A high level of demand in turn is a prerequisite for safeguarding Norwegian jobs. In other words there is a very fine balancing point here between the level of buying power and employment, something some critics of economic policy seem to forget," the LO chairman said.

Finance Minister Ulf Sand said the poll clearly indicates how strong the goal of full employment stands in this country with a clear majority expressing willingness to give up some of their own buying power to guarantee work for everyone. "My hope is that we can manage to keep employment up without reducing buying power. But if a conflict should arise here this corresponds to the position of the government that employment considerations must come first," said Sand.

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CSO: 3108/177

FINANCE MINISTER DISCUSSES EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Aug 81 p 30

[Text] "Norway is in a better position than any other country when it comes to unemployment, including youthful unemployment. No matter how one uses statistics or calculations no basis can be found for saying that on average we will have a higher unemployment rate than 2 percent, that is 35,000 people out of work, which is also suggested in the revised national budget," Finance Minister Ulf Sand said to AFTENPOSTEN.

The finance minister rejected the claims of Norwegian Bank director Hermod Skanland who stretched the estimate to between 2 and 2.5 percent and those of Conservative financial policy spokesman Rolf Presthus who says this is much too low and that by the end of the year the number of people out of work will approach 100,000. He also included the disabled, women and young people who do not appear in official statistics.

The finance minister said Presthus is shuffling his cards in an incredible way without being able to document any of his statements. No matter which statistics or definitions one uses with regard to unemployment it is impossible to reach figures anywhere near those cited by Presthus in the view of the finance minister. "Internationally speaking Norway is in a good position whether one looks at total unemployment or at youthful unemployment separately. Switzerland is at roughly the same level but that is due to the special circumstance that the Swiss have cut down on the number of foreign workers. Next after Norway with its 2 percent comes Japan with 2.2 percent. The other OECD lands have much higher rates.

"No statistics support the figures quoted by Presthus and there are no indications that unemployment will rise to 2.5 percent as director Skanland suggested," the finance minister said.

What about youthful unemployment?

"The revised national budget estimates an unemployment rate of 6.6 percent among young people, e.g. those between 15 and 24. Sweden is lower than we are with around 5 percent while countries like Denmark and England have over 11 percent. Here too we are doing well on an international level. Of course we must view seriously the fact that youthful unemployment is rising. The municipal affairs minister will meet with the labor market factions on this matter and discuss such things as better training conditions in firms," said Finance Minister Ulf Sand.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH GIVEN ON TURGUT OZDES

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 19 Jun 81 p 9

[Article in the series: "Introducing Our Businessmen"]

[Text] Turgut Ozdes, born in Istanbul in 1937, is director general of TEKSKON, Textile and Garment Industry Incorporated, and a member of its Administration Assembly.

Ozdes attended primary, middle and high school at Galatasaray Lycee and was graduated from the Istanbul University Faculty of Economics in 1960. He and his wife, Ender, have one son, Taner (18), and a daughter, Ayse (14). Taner is in high school and his sister Ayse is in middle school. Ender, a high school graduate, is a housewife.

Before assuming his present job, Turgut Ozdes was sales and manufacturing coordinator, export director and sales director at Mensucat Central. Ozdes speaks French and English and has published articles in many newspapers and magazines.

Turgut Ozdes swam and played water sports at the Galatasaray Club and says that he now likes to use his spare time teaching these sports to youngsters. He also enjoys reading in his spare time.

Ozdes describes himself as "extremely serious and logical, softhearted and having tolerance for people's problems, but never undisciplined tolerance."

Fond of debate, Ozdes cannot help but offer opposing opinions, though greeting all with maturity.

He is not formal, but in personal relationships, responds appropriately to formal situations. He does whatever the situation calls for. When called upon, he is happy to be able to resolve a personnel problem.

Sometimes set in his ways, Ozdes still takes his share of the blame for errors. He can apologize when necessary and, admitting no display of anger, is amiable and easy-going.

As a legacy of the camaraderie at Galatasaray, he dearly loves to play jokes and does not mind when jokes are played on him, and his friends say that is is witty. He spends his money carefully, but those who provide him some service can be pleased by his largesse.

Ozdes watches his weight and says he has no problem when it comes to food. He usually goes to bed at 2300 hours and rises at 0700. He is a heavy sleeper, but says he can get by on 6 good hours of sleep.

Turgut Ozdes likes to spend time with his friends and is known at work as a natural leader and organizer. Everything has to be organized for him. Meticulous in speech, he explains everything carefully and even watches his listeners' expressions and repeats anything that may not have been understood. It is not hard for him to move from one subject to another, however.

Ozdes is extremely punctual, arriving at least 10 to 15 minutes early for appointments, and is impatient with lateness.

Ozdes appreciates silence and tries to avoid any noise other than music whenever possible. Because he travels frequently in his work, he prefers to fly as it is faster.

Pleading lack of free time, he has no hobbies, but enjoys playing cards as long as no gambling is involved. He likes all kinds of music.

Ozdes likes to read all kinds of books, especially on professional topics, but prefers detective novels for relaxation. In the newspapers, he turns first to the columns, editorials and investigative articles.

Turgut Ozdes smokes Samsun cigarettes and prefers whiskey and raki to drink. He takes a glass of whiskey when relaxing and prefers raki with meals. His favorite brand of raki is Tekirdag.

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CSO: 4654/71

URANIUM BEARING COAL SOLD TO ROMANIA

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 20 Jun 81 pp 1, 15

[Text] Incirliova (Aydin), (HURRIYET NEWS AGENCY)--Romania's insistence on purchasing the low-quality coal from Yatagan District in Mugla aroused the suspicions of the regional directorate of the Turkish Coal Works, which is attached to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. Nuclear Research Institute experts were sent to the area and discovered deposits of the world's highest quality uranium extending 1 meter in width and depth. Meanwhile, it was determined that for 4 years Romania has been producing significant amounts of uranium from the 1.2 million tons of coal it bought at \$15 per ton. A report was submitted to the National Security Council.

The Romanian trade delegation which came to Turkey said that they wanted to buy the ungraded coal from Yatagan for use at various factories this year, as in past years. Turkish authorities, however, informed them that the entire field had been nationalized because the Yatagan thermal station, which is now under construction, was being built there, and for this reason, no coal could be sold from the area. The Turkish authorities suggested Soma coal, which is known to be of a higher quality, in order that the country might earn the foreign exchange.

Shortly after the talks between the Turkish and Romanian authorities concluded in this way, the Romanian government made another initiative, insisting on coal from Yatagan, and asked for an immediate reply.

Romania's insistent demand for the low-grade coal attracted the attention of the Energy and Natural Resources Ministry regional directorate. Suspicious authorities notified the ministry and sent two experts from the Aegean University's Nuclear Research Institute. The experts discovered, after long and exhausting tests, deposits of the world's highest quality uranium.

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CSO: 4654/71

PRICE HIKES SET FOR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 27 Jun 81 pp 1, 7

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURİYET BUREAU)--Prices of petroleum products have been revised, with increases of 4 liras per liter of regular gasoline, 5 liras for super-grade gasoline, 3 liras for kerosene and diesel fuel and 40 liras for a 12-kilogram cylinder of bottled gas.

According to the announcement made by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the price of regular gasoline rises from 60 liras to 64 liras, super-grade gasoline from 66 liras to 71 liras, and kerosene and diesel fuel from 42 liras to 45 liras.

The price of a regular, 12-kilogram cylinder of bottled gas goes up 6.9 percent from 580 liras to 620 liras, with picnic-size cylinders increased 5.5 percent [as published] from 105 liras to 115 liras.

Heating oil, which is 33.10 liras per liter, will cost 36 liras; no 5 fuel oil, which is 30.84 liras, will cost 33 liras; no 6 fuel oil, which is 27 liras, will cost 29 liras.

The new prices on petroleum products are applicable to Ankara; new prices for other provinces will depend on their distance from the refineries.

Authorities said that price hikes for petroleum products were caused by losses incurred recently in daily adjustments of exchange rates for the Turkish lira against the U.S. dollar. The Turkish lira has taken a 6.6 percent loss of value against the U.S. dollar in the period between the last price hike on petroleum products on 21 May and today.

Petroleum products prices rose nearly 200 percent in the first 6 months of last year, as contrasted with 20 percent in the first 6 months of 1981.

When Energy and Natural Resources Ministry authorities announced the new price hike, they said that petroleum products had gone up because the exchange rate had risen from 104 liras to the dollar in May 1981 to 111 liras on 25 June. They also said that the previous decision to raise prices had resulted from the increasing value of the dollar against the Turkish lira.

The government halted the sale of all petroleum and petroleum products throughout the country to make the new price adjustment.

The Finance Ministry published a communique on the adjustment of petroleum products prices, according to which all businesses, their branches, agents and dealers and other retailers which have petroleum products on hand for sale or manufacturing purposes will report to their tax offices the amount, load and types of products they have in depots, stores, distributors or tanks or in transit. When the new prices on petroleum products are announced, taxpayers whose stocks have been reported may begin selling immediately at these prices.

According to the Finance Ministry communique, liquid fuel establishments and companies will deposit the difference between the old prices and the new prices on the amounts they have on hand in account no 640/2367 at the central branch of the Turkish Central Bank or account no 640/900 at the Yenisehir branch of the Turkish Agricultural Bank.

Old and New Prices on Petroleum Products

Product	Old [Turkish liras]	New	Percentage [of increase]
Super-grade gasoline	66.00	71.00	7.5
Regular gasoline	60.00	64.00	6.6
Kerosene	42.00	45.00	7.1
Diesel fuel	42.00	45.00	7.1
Heating oil	33.10	36.00	8.7
Fuel oil (no 5)	30.84	33.00	7
Fuel oil (no 6)	27.00	29.00	7.4
Bottled gas (12 kg)	580.00	620.00	6.9
Picnic bottled gas	105.00	115.00	9.5

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CSO: 4654/71

CONTRACT BIDS OPEN ON DAM, IRRIGATION PROJECTS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 25 Jun 81 p 4

[Text] Ankara--Turkish contractors will build the Guldurcek Dam and auxiliary facilities, located in Cankiri Province and designed to control irrigation and flooding. The Office of Dams and Hydroelectric Stations of the State Hydraulic Affairs Directorate General [DSI] offered the contract by the "bid invitation" system. The DSI Office of Projects and Construction also opened bidding for irrigation construction at the Tercan Plain in Erzurum Province.

The general construction in connection with the Guldurcek Dam to be built by Turkish contractors reportedly consists of the major body of the dam, to be 70 m in height and 265 m in length, plus the related facilities. Also among the construction is a derivation tunnel, 322 m long with an interior capacity of 2.5 m, a discharge weir 322 m in length and with an interior capacity of 2.5 m and a 160-meter concrete-clad, lateral intake spillway.

Group "A" of those desiring the contract must present contractor's credentials of at least 750 million liras, a construction materials report, a financial report, a technical personnel report and contract conditions.

Application will be open until 2 July, and those approved for participation will be sent a bid form and asked to submit a bid.

Tercan Plain Irrigation

Meanwhile, the DSI Office of Projects and Construction opened bidding for irrigation of the Tercan Plain in Erzurum.

The contract, having an estimated cost of 660 million liras, will be awarded at the DSI Directorate General in Ankara on 26 June. Individuals or companies desiring the contract must apply for qualification certification by 18 June at the latest.

The Denizli Geothermal Station, the construction and installation of which is being handled by the Turkish Electric Power Enterprise [TEK] has assembly, testing and operation contracts coming up. The TEK has opened bidding on these jobs.

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CSO: 4654/71

ARCHBISHOP CHRYSOSTOMOS BLASTED AS 'IRRESPONSIBLE'

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 7-13 Aug 81 p 3

[Text]

Archbishop Chrysostomos' latest speech attacking the official line on the Cyprus question being followed by Athens and Nicosia has caused a storm in the Greek Cypriot Press, which sees it as an open clash between church and state.

Communist 'Haravghi' called the speech "irresponsible and provocative"; other newspapers described it as 'dangerous', and suggested that the Archbishop should confine himself to his religious duties and stop meddling in politics.

The Archbishop, speaking during a memorial service for the late President Makarios at Kykko Monastery, attacked the intercommunal talks. He said they were a "mockery" so long as they were conducted in the presence of the Turkish invasion forces.

Appeal

He demanded a "change of tactics in our struggle" and asked Greek Foreign Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, who was present in the church, to tell Athens that it should assume a "more active" role in order to help get the Turkish troops out of the island.

In an emotional and impassioned appeal, he told Mr Mitsotakis that Athens should not be frightened by the distance between Greece and Cyprus, and that it should help with "courageous deeds" in the liberation of the whole of the island.

He bluntly told the Greek Foreign Minister: "We demand that the Greek government place Cyprus as the priority issue in its foreign policy. We demand that Greece stop wondering who is going to drive the Turkish invaders out of Cyprus. Greece should realise that it is her own duty and responsibility to do this, both as a mother country and as a guarantor of the island's independence".

Greece, Turkey and Britain are the joint guarantors of Cyprus' independence under the 1960 treaty establishing the Republic.

The Archbishop started his sermon by complaining of a "complete lack of fighting spirit" and of "indifference and inactivity despite the tragedy of the situation".

He said statements about a "good climate" at the talks and of the coming Turkish proposals were creating "false euphoria", prevented

action on the international level, and freed Turkey of any responsibility in the eyes of world opinion.

He called on everyone to realise the "deadly danger" resulting from the continued presence of the Turkish troops in the island, and said people should "wake up and get mobilised" and not become complacent with "valium tranquilisers".

"Otherwise 'we or our children will one day be forcibly uprooted from this land of our forefathers and seek a home elsewhere'".

Message

Asking that mainland Greeks should not just "look from afar" but help their Cypriot brothers struggling for salvation, the Archbishop turned to Mitsotakis and told him, "this is the message we beg you to take back to Athens".

The ancient church at Kykko Monastery was turned into a "public debating hall", in the words of a newspaper columnist, as President Kyprianou and then Mr Mitsotakis replied to the Archbishop's remarks. The three speeches, together with the whole service, were broadcast live on Cyprus radio.

President Kyprianou defended his government's policies, saying he was following the Makarios line, and asked everybody to contribute to strengthening the internal front through cooperation and a positive, not negative, attitude. He warned that the government would never allow a repetition of the conditions that existed before the 1974 coup. The inter-communal talks offered a correct procedure for an "honourable" settlement, he said.

Mr Kyprianou called on everybody to follow coming developments in a prudent way "without a tendency either towards demagoguery or defeatism".

In his speech, Mr Mitsotakis assured the Archbishop and Greek Cypriots that

Greece would continue to offer its "undivided and wholehearted support, without reservations or calculations".

Rebuke

"You can have faith in Greece, We shall never abandon you and we shall never fail to do our duty towards Cypriot Hellenism" he declared, amidst applause.

In what was seen as a slight rebuke for the Archbishop, Mr Mitsotakis pointed out that the handling of the Cyprus problem was decided by democratic means. He also stressed that "unity must not be an empty word", adding: "In order to fill the great gap left by Makarios, there must be true unity both in Cyprus and among Greeks everywhere".

Greek Cypriot newspapers generally interpreted the

speeches as amounting to an "open public confrontation" between church and state. Independent 'Agon' took a stand against the Archbishop.

Haravghi said the Archbishop's "unacceptable" speech was an "insult to the patriotic forces fighting on the basis of the Makarios line", and claimed the Archbishop appeared ready to join those "seeking a Cyprus settlement through the intervention of the imperialists."

Opposition daily 'Simerini' said the Archbishop continued to "live in the clouds", apparently not realising that the ethnarchic role of the church was over.

"We respectfully suggest that His Beatitude should confine himself to his religious and spiritual duties", it added.

'NEW LEFT' FACES REORGANIZATION DIFFICULTIES

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 30 Jul 81 p 8

[Article by Dieter Wenz: "Difficulties of Old 'New Left'"]

[Text] The end of the KPD, its self-dissolution in March 1980, also signified the end of a precarious chapter of the former so-called "New Left," the post-APO [extra-parliamentary opposition] Left. After 10 years there is nothing left for those groups in the FRG who were finally hoping to find true socialist salvation in a strict Leninist organization, following the disintegration of student groups that were operating in an individualistic-emancipationist manner. Everything is in ruins, material assets have turned to debts, ideology to disillusionment. Although a few communist groups exist still today, it is rather a sad situation: It is not so much defiant persistence but a lack of intellectual strength to proceed with an orderly self-dissolution.

The end of the KPD, which at its time was announced to the public with a big bang, is actually only a formal indication of the end of a sectarian communist-group orthodoxy in West Germany. It has been more or less "dead" for some time, when considering its overall political effect on the Left in the FRG; with respect to the "working masses," whom it presumptuously claims to represent, it has been dead since its inception: From the time when they were formed, communist groups have never really exerted a great deal of influence on the "proletariat" in West Germany. Does that imply that the demise of the communist groups has no significance, that the incident can simply be filed away? Certainly not. The KPD leaders who lost their troops have been trying for months to "form" new left-wing fragmentary groups (those following Bahro, the "Greens" and the "new social movements"). And they are not the only ones. We can gather this information from current left-wing discussion rounds or pertinent publications.

A statement that can be heard unusually often today is that the KPD collapsed because it came face to face with "very real questions." In essence, this is saying a great deal: First, the West German socialist Left outside the SPD has been hit and affected internally because of the failure of the communist movement and, second, thanks to its organizational differences there has been no noticeable "disintegration" to date, as was the case with the KPD--at least not to the outside.

As a consequence, there is less and less self-righteous talk by the extra-parliamentary left-wing scene, when it comes to lashing out at "communist group sectarianism." Rather, now there is more heretic mention of an "intellectual sickness" that has affected the entire Left.

Did it not miss all opportunities to join in the wooing for the alternatives, which had taken place in an emancipationist manner? Were they not taken by surprise when the "Greens," the antinuclear-power movement, women's groups, the coloreds, the squatters made their appearance in this country, and are they not quite helpless when it comes to the Human Rights Movement in East Europe?

For the first time attempts are under way to take stock, and with it comes the recognition that they have been totally oblivious of the "real conditions" in West Germany and "conditions" in general all over the world, the way things really are. Although on the whole there has been little discussion on the decline of the communist phenomena, in some locations it has become the subject of a somewhat hesitant but comprehensive interpretation. The key phrase is "reorganization process." It will be heard frequently in the near future.

Against the background of these current discussions, former KPD leaders appear more or less like people who have completed a long march through the Leninist wilderness, incredulous at what they see-instead of the promised green plains they are facing new deserts that are frighteningly similar to the old ones. Disillusionment set in quickly. An example is "Sectarian" Ziesemer, who has been enlightened only recently. Until fall 1979 he was a member of the Central Committee of the KPD Youth Association. Not long ago, during a discussion which had been arranged by the Berlin publishing house of Olle & Wolter, he said that he had noticed almost immediately "that...the different factions of the Left...do not display any difference in the way in which they approach certain problems."

Are there no changes on the socialist Left? It appears that their most ardent critics have indeed turned into today's unsuccessful orthodox members. Willi Jasper, cofounder of the KPD, onetime member of the Central Committee and of the KPD Politburo, talks about the "confused state" of that segment of the Left that is "on the outside," which had been the hope for the time following the fall of the KPD, the sudden collapse of the "comintern mentality." But he himself was amazed when he found out that "similar processes are going on." Right now, what is actually taking place on the Left is the following: They still believe that in principle every question can be solved by applying the old approach. In other words, criticism of capitalism, "which is...so traditionalistic and ineffective that (in the end) they will (certainly) be able to agree (again) on abstract socialist goals and ideas."

Karl Schloegel, member of the Central Command of the former Communist Student Federation, remarked that he was surprised that "in part" the extra-parliamentary Left was "dealing with problems in a manner that was based on reflexes, which (formerly)" had "already" been "labeled obsolete within the KPD." Current intellectual exchanges take place on a level "that employs competing 'Marxist interpretations.'" The discussion does not zero in on the suitability of a theory to be applied to the topic, but it is merely an ideological exchange..as if nothing had happened during the last 10 years: wild gestures with ideological slogans." After all, nothing can be accomplished any more by borrowing from the traditional and with surrogates," Schloegel declared.

Ziesemer gets down to specifics and says that he sees no other choice: It is "no longer enough to stick to the old categories," unless one is willing to abandon that society which one criticizes constantly, vowing that it must be changed. The "reality of the FRG": Jasper is sounding a warning. In his opinion it is now no longer only

"a problem of the so-called Marxism-Leninism" "but of Marxism in all its philosophical, political and organizational variations," and this reality can no longer be explained by using "theoretical props." In Schloegel's opinion the Left must now learn to relate its thinking to specific issues and not stop at "axioms" and Marxist "classic authorities."

Anyway, how can this society--in its present shape--"be abolished," Ziesemer asks. "What aspects do we reject, what aspects do we--the Left--want to preserve?" According to Ziesemer, the recent discussion about the self-dissolution of the KPD yielded some "hereditary factors" that may be useful for the socialist Left, above all, "the complete review of East European experiences, the understanding of the significance... of the negative example of real socialism."

Nevertheless, the fallen former leaders of the "New Left" are not inclined to present an optimistic outlook. Schloegel talks about an "intellectual impoverishment" on the Left and he fears the continuation of the "refusal to question oneself and one's own thinking." In Jasper's opinion, "the questions that led to the dissolution of the KPD are questions that affect the entire Left," and in his view the only chance lies in a new beginning: "If the Left lost the truth, it should no longer pretend." Its situation is "much worse than many want to admit."

Anyway, what can be done? Ulf Wolter, publisher of more sophisticated left-wing publications knows what to do: "If we accept the fact that we (in the FRG) have reached a stage when a (pure) socialist practice is no longer the main issue...a clear left perspective becomes apparent, which is reformism." And as things stand, "in the FRG" reformism represents the "general perception. Ignoring this reality" inevitably leads to "failure."

8991

CSO: 3103/391

LE PORS: DECISIONS, SALARIES, UNIONS, DECENTRALIZATION

Pluralism, Government Salaries, Decentralization

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 27 Jul 81 p 3

[Interview with Anicet Le Pors, communist minister of civil service and administrative reform, by Jean-Luc Mano]

[Text] One month after the communist ministers assumed their responsibilities, we interviewed one of them, Anicet Le Pors, the minister of civil service and administrative reform. For more than an hour we discussed with him his plans, his methods, and his ambitions for his ministry. The thread of the conversation sometimes carried us somewhat far afield from our original areas of concern. But his interview does shed more light on the activity of the second communist minister of civil service since the Liberation, at which time Maurice Thorez held the office.

[Question] The first thing I want to ask you is how you went about picking your staff.

[Answer] I set up my office along the lines suggested by my previous experience. I worked for 26 years in the civil service. During all of that time I was a trade union militant. The first name that came to mind was Rene Bidouze, for he was secretary general of the General Union of Public Employees (CGT), in other words he held a top-ranking position in the civil service union movement. As I was familiar with his professional caliber, his dedication, and his scrupulousness, he was the first person I thought of asking. Besides him, I called on people I knew well and whose qualities and competence I valued.

[Question] Another aspect is striking. On your staff there are several noncommunists. I want to ask you straight away if there is not some demagoguery in such an action.

[Answer] There is no demagoguery. I simply wanted to show my commitment to pluralism and, I will also say, somewhat to set an example.

I called on several noncommunists, such as Michel Mousel, whom I knew in 1968 at the ministry of finance. We lived through the events of May and June together, but it must be admitted in a somewhat antagonistic way. But he is someone I esteem and whose exceptional qualities I appreciate.

Indispensable Pluralism*

None of all this has anything to do with gimmickry. I think one must have a certain humility. No one person has a monopoly on interesting ideas and correct positions. Here, we have two staff meetings per week and we are working in a very collective spirit.

While I may in the last resort make the decisions, I have verified by experience that this practice of pluralism is indispensable. People with other than communist sensibilities make proposals and give out opinions, which are sometimes accepted and sometimes rejected. Similarly, we communists also express opinions which are also debated. All that is very stimulating.

Those who have a point of view different from my own help me a great deal by giving me their advice and by encouraging us to reconsider ideas we had looked on as definitive truths. Indeed, our own ideas are thrown into question by that way of life and invigorated by the collision with others. It is a factor that promotes efficiency. Certainly, each minister is the sole judge of what is good or bad for him. But on the basis of my experience, I personally consider it stimulating and beneficial for all leftist viewpoints to be represented in the ministerial offices of this coalition government. That there should be, for example, socialists in the offices of communist ministers and communists in the offices of socialist ministers. Diversity is an asset, if it remains coherent.

[Question] You speak of throwing into question. Does that mean that your ideas, your conceptions forged in the opposition are being modified or enriched by the exercise of power?

[Answer] That is a very important question. For me the answer is unequivocally: yes. Moreover, one must not limit that just to members of the cabinet. Other discussions take place with the bureaucracy, which has its customs, its ways of viewing things, often impregnated with the experience of decades. These acquired actions are often useful, they take account of certain realities of social life.

There is another interesting aspect, which is interministerial work. Let us take the example of the communication I made at the last meeting of the council of ministers. There were hours and hours of discussions with the representatives of a dozen ministries who argued with us, often sharply. On 15 July, I had sent a report to the prime minister. My paper was picked to pieces, but in the positive sense of the expression. It was enriched, corrected, and today the product is considerably improved.

So in coming to the ministry I have had a personal enrichment, an enrichment of ideas, and I also think an enrichment which can be of value to all the forces of the left.

[Question] That's all very good, but in the aggregate does all this not represent constraints? To speak plainly, are you able to act, or are you not, as some have contended, a hostage in the government?

*Sub-heads added by the editors.

[Answer] Of course, this could be taken as a constraint. But primarily it is a question of disciplined collective work, of coping with the contradictions that exist in the most reasonable way possible, in other words of coming to a positive resolution of these contradictions and conflicts of ideas.

As for the other, it would be wrong to think of us, and in any case wrong to think of me as anybody's hostage. Naturally, there is room for debate on that question. But the communist ministers are full-fledged ministers. There is no problem in that regard. I think that all the communist ministers would say this: we are perfectly at ease. At the present stage, there are no problems of direction, notwithstanding conflicting ideas, adjustments, refinements, in short, the daily work of government. As far as I myself am concerned, I tell you again: I am perfectly at ease in the government.

Full-Scale Negotiations

[Question] Let us move on to your method of administration. And first of all your concept of dialogue. Have your meetings with the unions been fruitful?

[Answer] That would be for the unions to judge. I do not want to prejudge what they got from them. I have received the seven employee federations three times in three weeks. I did not sense any misgivings on their part--quite to the contrary--in dealing with a communist minister.

Everyone is in agreement, going beyond the differing positions, in considering that the facts should be decisive.

[Question] You speak of facts. Let us continue along this line. The employee unions were hardly satisfied by the wage measures taken by the first Mauroy government. Can you reassure them today?

[Answer] I want to have a relationship with the unions wherein each assumes his own responsibilities. Under the previous administration, the ministers did not take theirs. They created structures to /"talk"/ about the problems, a species of safety value for their demands. Inevitably that had an impact on the comportment of both sides.

As for myself, I intend to fully respect the autonomy of the union organizations. But I expect them to assume their own responsibilities in a positive fashion in the administration of affairs, in order to enhance even further than in the past their capability to propose a plan. We must distinguish between proposals and demands.

[Question] Let us return to wage problems.

[Answer] At the present stage, and while the budget is still under preparation, I can only repeat what I said at the last meeting of the council of ministers. The ministers under the former administration confined themselves basically to wage problems, and their meetings with the unions to negotiations of a very limited scope. I however intend to give full scope to negotiations, that is, to have them cover all of the major issues in the civil service.

On remuneration, I will act so as to maintain the mean purchasing power of employees, with significant improvement for the lowest-paid categories. We will proceed to increase as part of a restructuring of pay in the civil service. In accordance with the desires of the unions, we are going to attack the problem of the salary scale.

[Question] When will the decisions be taken?

[Answer] A commission (the Lasry commission) is working. It was to submit its report this fall. I have asked to have it by 15 August. Naturally this restructuring will take time. But I will discharge all my responsibilities and set forth the general guiding concepts in September.

Rejuvenating the Civil Service

[Question] Let us move to another subject. You said on taking up your duties that your ministry would play an active role in decentralization. What does that mean?

[Answer] It is inevitable that the decentralization of power, which is a democratic initiative, will run into the consequences of the past administration. The latter was marked by the burgeoning of state centralism, of bureaucracy, and by incessant attacks on the rights of employees and those affected by the bureaucracy.

I want to combat all these consequences and play an active role in the establishment of a new distribution of powers and of new modes of democratic expression both for employees and for those affected by the bureaucracy.

The changes in structure and jurisdiction entailed by the proposed decentralization have inevitable consequences on the way agents of the state exercise their functions. I personally am determined to embark on a vast program to rejuvenate the civil service, which cannot remain in the same state it was in in 1946, modified only in a limited (and negative) way in 1959. All provisions regarding the general status of the employees must be preserved and adapted to the new context, while respecting the principle of the uniqueness of the national civil service and also the democratic gains which the employees have obtained by their struggles. We must, finally, have a real local public service.

[Question] This will be my final question. At the time of the Liberation, the communist ministers put their names on great achievements. Setting your modesty aside, is it your ambition to make comparable achievements and, above all, do you think you have the resources to do it?

[Answer] I think above all that we have no choice. The communist ministers cannot be mediocre ministers. They are carrying an enormous political responsibility, especially since our communist predecessors made such important contributions. I am obliged to set my standards very high. I am not starting from scratch, but I do want to undertake the gigantic task of renovating the civil service and improving the material position and morale of state personnel in a step which, even in the civil service, should have the collective-management characteristic which is the essence of democratic progress.

Policies Toward Government Employees

Paris REVOLUTION in French 31 Jul-3 Aug 81 pp 8-9

[Press conference of Anicet Le Pors, communist minister of civil service and administrative reform; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] The decentralization reform is at the center stage of events. We asked Anicet Le Pors, the civil service minister, for his opinion on the future status of government personnel.

As the minister responsible to the prime minister for the civil service and administrative reform, Le Pors presented to the council of ministers a communication concerning the immediate measures and directions of government in this field. During a press conference, he outlined his priorities for the summer.

[Question] You were a government employee for 26 years, then an elected senator, and now you have become a minister. So you have considerable experience in government service. How do you see your relations with the bureaucracy?

[Answer] The French bourgeoisie has always tried to reduce the status of the government employee to that of a /subject/ by denying him the rights of full /citizenship./

One of them said early in the 19th Century: /"The special position of government employees could and in fact should, in certain circumstances, forbid them from doing things which others are permitted to do."/ The author was Theophile Berlier, a count in the First Empire.

A century and a half later, another of its [the bourgeoisie's] spokesmen gave this solemn assurance: /"The government employee is a man of silence. He works, he serves, he keeps quiet..."/ Everyone will have recognized in this forceful definition extracted from the book "Death of the Republican State" an especially eminent representative of the former majority, Mr Michel Debre.

Well, no! For me the new civil servant citizen has nothing to do with this humiliating position: he or she is a man or woman of conscience, competence, and a sense of responsibility, who today is called upon to devote all of his or her faculties to the service of the national interest, to the service of the democratic change our people have chosen. Therefore, I intend to discuss things with them, with their union organizations, for I consider them first of all to be responsible citizens. That means to grant them corresponding status. The /new citizenship/ which the government is offering to the French people cannot in fact exclude the civil servants.

I have, moreover, met with the seven organizations representing government employees three times in the course of the first three weeks that followed my nomination.

In the fall I will not impose on them the obligation of signing more or less formal /accords./ I respect their freedom of choice too much, their mission of defending the interests of the workers they represent. If there is an accord, so much the better; if not, everyone at his own level will carry out his duties. We have so many questions to discuss that it would not be surprising that on some particular points with

particular organizations there are unresolved disputes: we are in fact going to examine the question of remuneration (and the restructuring of the wage scale), job creation (which is linked to problems of reducing the work week and hours of operation in the various public services), the new rights of government employees (social, economic, and political rights), and the administrative reform which also involves the decentralization projects.

[Question] But are you yourself, the minister of civil service, concerned with a reform which eventually will affect the local communities: the regional, departmental, and local levels?

[Answer] It is quite obvious that it is appropriate for the minister of the civil service to play the primary role in terms of changing the statutory provisions related to the government's plans. This is also the view of the prime minister. The implementation of this reform can certainly not go far without the broadest possible negotiation with the labor organizations representing the public employees. In fact, to imagine that it could be otherwise would be directly in contradiction with the spirit presiding over this reform. This is why the government lays such stress on its commitment to provide this negotiation. This will be done both in the framework of regular bodies such as the High Council of the Civil Service, whose functions I intend to restore, and in the framework of structures to be created for the reform. No one will be moved before this is done. It is obvious that the reform will not be against the interests of the employees. To do it without their participation would simply empty it of meaning. So it will be done with them.

The rejuvenation of the national civil service must therefore have as a reference the general statute on government employees, which the time has now come to improve. It is going in tandem with a decentralizing initiative which will broaden the rights, protections, and freedoms of all, and the establishment of a statute modelled on the national civil service act, for the local communities.

I would like to conclude by underlining two aspects. In place of the former administration's methods--transmitting government orders rejecting or dismissing cases--in place of this /negative administration/ we will substitute study missions, advisory missions, and other constructive proposals. Second aspect: the bureaucracy is going to find itself placed much more directly than before under the oversight of the duly elected representatives of the people. This is an act of basic confidence in the democracy in which we are invited to participate, since it amounts ultimately to realizing that in many domains the relationship between the sovereign people and its administrative branch no longer has need of an executive power that is centralized to the greatest possible extent. Certainly, there can be no question of reducing the effectiveness of the civil service, or at the community level of permitting an increase in the ever-present risk of this distortion of public activity which is bureaucracy.

In reality, it is a question of a new concept of relations between the administrative branch and the elected officials, the representatives of social forces and in general the concomitants of decentralization.

But I do not want to set anything in concrete today, for, on the one hand debate is beginning soon in the National Assembly, and on the other hand I must meet with the trade union organizations once again when the legislature comes back into session, to discuss it with them.

9516

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PRODUCTIVE CLASSES REACT TO PASOK PROGRAM

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 26 Jun 81 pp 1, 3

[Article by Th. P. Kassimi]

[Text] The statements by A. Papandreou which outline PASOK's program of government have given rise to strong reactions as well as pronounced uneasiness, especially among tradesmen and craftsmen with small to intermediate businesses, but in the commercial community more generally also. The prominence given to the taking of "policing" measures in connection with commerce has caused a particular sensation, at a time when tens of thousands of businessmen are up in arms. Their demand is that the policy of decontrolling the market must be continued, their argument being that the ongoing price freeze has led the small and medium-sized businesses into an impasse. The threat of a "socialization" of broad sectors of business activity, without either the nature or the extent of this measure being clarified on the part of PASOK, has led to similar reactions.

Characteristic of the reaction by tradesmen and craftsmen with small and medium-sized businesses to the platform statements of A. Papandreou is the reference by the branches concerned to the fact that despite the mobilization of PASOK's party machinery to try to produce positive reactions from representatives of union organizations, this has had no results. The only statement approving of the "policing" measures proclaimed by A. Papandreou was that of the New Movement of Merchants. This is a small group which has tried repeatedly, without success, to get elected to the administration of the Commercial Chamber.

The General Confederation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen of Greece avoided taking any position, despite the soundings on this question which were made in its administration, while the members of many associations and federations have asked their administrative bodies to convene special assemblies in order to take decisions to deal with the dangers which are looming for the small and medium-sized businesses arising from the platform statements by the PASOK chairman.

Grocers throughout the country are showing more energetic activity; they have been bothered by the announcement that "there will be a price freeze on basic products of common consumption."

The Price Freeze

A characteristic view is that of a member of the administration of the Panhellenic Federation of Grocers, namely that "the freezing of prices leads to a lowering

of the quality of products, favors the black market, decreases the supply of products, and in the last analysis functions to the detriment of the consumer himself and the small retailer. With respect to those items whose prices have been decontrolled but with the profit margins being regulated at all times, the supply has increased and prices have been held down because of competition. On the other hand, wherever the freeze or price-fixings have continued, there the supplementary charge becomes operative and provisioning to retailers becomes concentrated in the hands of a few suppliers. In case of a new price freeze, the small grocers--even those who are members of cooperatives--will disappear and only the large food-marketing chains will be able to survive."

At the same time, the restaurateurs, pastry cooks, and coffee-house keepers have stated already that they will begin refusing to sell certain products, and at a later stage will close up their shops for good, if the prices of all those products which remain "frozen" are not decontrolled. The relevant statements by A. Papandreou on a new, more general freezing of prices has worried the above businessmen above all, since they are facing the threat of a definite destruction of their businesses. The only ones with chances of survival would be those who agree to lower the quality and decrease the quantity of products offered--to the detriment, of course, of the consumers.

The Craftsmen

For their part, the representatives of the craftsmen argue that with a new freeze on prices they will be ruined, because they will not be able to stand up against the unfair competition of the large and financially powerful businesses. These have the capacity to either effect large purchases of raw materials at lower prices or decrease their production, which is based on automation and not on manpower, as is the case with the cottage industries, or even to suffer a loss for a certain period of time--something which the small cottage industry or business cannot tolerate.

The "Socialization" of Trade

Another point in the "platform" statements by the PASOK chairman which has worried merchants is his intention to turn over to State agencies the "major (?) importing and exporting business."

The question which is dominant in the market is: What does A. Papandreou mean by the term "major" importing and exporting business? Thus, the butchers argue that if meat is included in this, such an action will result in a return to the old "disgraceful" status quo of the leveling of quality and the imposition of a "supplementary charge" in the course of its handling. Nowadays above all--when the professional butchers' organizations have begun to explore, with State support, the European meat markets and are preparing already to engage in collective importing, while already the number of meat importers and merchants has expanded significantly through the implementation of this new system--any taking over of this activity by a State agency will have negative consequences both on the butchers and on the consumers.

An analogous position is maintained also by grocers in cooperatives, as the question relates to foodstuffs. In particular, the members of the Panhellenic

Union of Grocery Companies, Cooperatives, and Associations of Greece have called repeatedly for the implementation of the relevant decision of the government on financing grocers in cooperatives for the purpose of the collective importing of foodstuffs and the securing of low prices for the consumer. Any take-over of such an activity by the State will have as its end results the creation in the market of oligopolistic situations--which will have a few controlling the market--the burdening of the consumers, the operating of a black market, and the ruining of the small grocers themselves.

Relevant to this is also the reaction of the exporters and members of cooperatives engaged in exports of fresh or processed agricultural products on a large scale.

Specifically, it is stressed that the "major" exporting trade has to do chiefly with fresh and processed agricultural products, a field in which both certain cooperatives and also a large number of private parties are successfully active.

Any take-over of this activity by a State agency will give rise to tremendous dangers, especially as to exports of fresh agricultural products, which exhibit unique conditions as concerns the fixing of their prices on foreign markets. Given the present situation and given the satisfactory level of information which is transmitted daily in connection with deliberations on and the channeling of products to foreign markets, in recent years the marketing of this produce at adequately high prices has been a success, through the cooperation of the State on the one hand and cooperatives and exporters on the other, and this has had a positive effect on farmers' incomes. On the other hand, the creation of a State agency to take over this activity will result in reduced markets and the obtaining of lower prices, to the detriment not only of the growers but also of the economy more generally.

The Pharmaceutical Industry

Finally, a more general uneasiness has arisen from the use of the term "socialization" of businesses, the objective supposedly being to camouflage preparations for a nationalization of the major importing and exporting trade, the insurance companies, which employ thousands of professionals, and the drug industry, which not only employs a large number of salaried and wage-earning personnel but also has had to its credit in recent years a large exporting activity to countries of the Middle East and the Arab world more generally.

More specifically, the nationalization of the pharmaceutical industries has worried especially a large number of the ill who fear that the result of this will be a reduction in the various types of drugs which are produced. In their opinion, these drugs cannot be replaced by others, both for substantive and for psychological reasons.

12114

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ANALYSIS OF REASONS FOR PCI ELECTION LOSSES IN BARI

Rome RINASCITA in Italian, 3, 10 Jul 81

[Article by Federico Rampini: "The Problems of a Divided Party"

[3 Jul 81, pp 9-10]

[Text] Conflicts going back to the 1970's surface between intellectuals and the old guard. Historical merits, misunderstanding, decline of the cadres that originated in the laboring class. Renewal of the party requires drastic choices, even concerning the moral question and they cannot be painless. The division between the "orphans" of the broad understandings and the authors of a sectarian opposition has its origin in a lack of understanding of what the city of Bari has become today. The failure of the southern translation of the alternative line failed not only here but throughout Puglia. How can the party heal so deep a crisis?

Bari, July. To emphasize the undoubted abilities of the Bari socialists, to exaggerate the scope of changes that took place in the economic and social fabric of this city could lead to giving secondary importance to the principal cause of the communist collapse in the 21 June elections which is the state of the Puglia and Bari PCI. And to understand how the party arrived at the present situation it is necessary to review the history of the PCI in this region over the past 10 to 20 years under broad headings.

In the years 1950 to 1960, the presence of the PCI was based upon a rank and file of construction workers and laborers: a sort of "encampment" in a city that already at that time had a tertiary vocation--a bridge for trade with the east, the location of an important university. At that time an objectively "parasitic" component was growing within the PCI. An example was the VIP's [notabili] linked to the Chamber of Labor. By virtue of a monopoly of the labor court cases, and legal aid to pensioners and laborers, they developed a very substantial business turnover.

But in the 1960's a great cultural ferment began in the city within the university, within Catholic culture, around the publishing house of Laterza. In part, this was mediated by Moro, in part it attracted leftist groups, around a group of intellectuals such as Franco De Felice, Giuseppe Vacca, Leone De Castris, Mario Santostasi, and Biagio de Giovanni. The two largest operations promoted by this group at the

end of the 1960's were the creation of the university section and the development of the De Donato publishing house. At the same time many of these intellectuals became party officials. And the "old" party at first had the ability and the merit to absorb these new forces. To cite an example: It was the "old" Tommaso Siculo, then regional secretary, who in 1969 proposed the admission of Giuseppe Vacca to the Central Committee. In those years the university section organized 400 cadres and it was the channel for admission of intellectuals from the Catholic world, from extraparlimentary groups, even from PeRepublican [Party] youth to the PCI. On the divorce referendum, the entire university (Moro's university!) voted "no." Then came the elections of 1975 and 1976 and the great leap forward by the PCI.

What happened from then to now? According to Massimo D'Alema, of the regional secretariat: "Everything that happens today was spawned by the conflicts of that time between the intellectual component and the old leaders. At that time multiplicity enriched the party, now, it has killed it since it did not lead to a synthesis." According to Peppino Cotturri, University of Bari professor, a reverse selection of cadres was produced: Since the screening was left in the hands of the leaders with a labor background, they always selected the "very loyal" or the "in-offensive." Thus they paralyzed that alliance, which could have been possible, between the old nuclei of the communist electorate and the new social groups of intellectuals, professionals, white collar workers. A close relationship exists between the academic intellectuals and the white collar workers and the businessmen: The University of Bari is a great center for the local bourgeoisie, in addition to being (through its ability to invest) one of the motivating forces of urban growth. The serious consequences of the rupture in relationship between the PCI and the intellectuals also is testified to by Prof Aldo Romano, socialist, president of the CSATA, modern computer and research center, spearhead of a trained Bari tertiary group. Romano says, "Between 1960 and 1975 a new intellectuality had grown up within the PCI capable of engaging in dialogue with the scientific world to the point of hegemonizing it, capable of understanding the progressive value of productive and administrative efficiency. But these intellectuals did not become leaders. Many very highly trained and able communist researchers work with me at CSATA but they have almost no contact with the PCI."

On the other hand, the loss of credibility of the Bari PCI is also due--as already has been observed by all commentators--to the approach to the policy of "broad understandings," of its vertical and at the same time secondary application, which led the PCI to in fact become compromised with the Christian democratic power system.

The last explosion of injuries within the PCI took place after the assassination of Comrade Benedetto Petrone. How that assassination was interpreted became a litmus test of the image the communists had of Bari. According to Enrico Piccone, ex-group leader in city hall (leader of the soft opposition which risks becoming a scapegoat thus offering an alibi to avoid deeper study), that assassination was the fruit of the reaction of the most backward speculative forces tied to the DC right and hostile to any involvement with the PCI and government of the city. This was the source of the need to "rob" from the DC the alliances with the healthiest productive groups, to involve them in a prospect of program development of the city. According to Piccone, the "other component" of the PCI saw the assassination of Petrone as a reason to demonize the entire Bari bourgeoisie and the entire DC and

to base upon it a strategy of alliances with the outcasts, the youth, the precarious unemployed intellectuals, for the purpose of "laying siege" to the city, to "eliminate from it" all productive forces.

But this counteropposition indicates the weakening and degradation of the party's internal dialectic: The positions that clash are those of the hard and sectarian opposition and of the orphans of the broad understandings. As a consequence, the PCI has never proposed the alternative in a city in which the alternative was on the march, and in the end it was born out of the slogan "socialist mayor." And in truth, according to Angiuli, secretary of the Bari Federation: "The party of the sections from the beginning was against broad understandings, and as a consequence, at that time, the divisions between the rank and file, those elected and the party leaders were constant. The harsh and superficial way in which the shift of the alternative was presented contributed to diminishing credibility also because our concrete policy was marked by a note of submerged continuism."

Vittorio Tanzarella, ex-Christian democratic councillor, one of the "founding members" of the Moro center-left at Bari, therefore a Catholic who voted no in the divorce referendum of 1974, and elected on the PCI ballot of 1976, also was pitiless in his analysis. He was the only independent reelected this year (not to speak of the businessmen elected on the PCI ballot with a personalized campaign that cost hundreds of millions of lire...), thanks to his extraordinary commitment to the theme of juvenile delinquency. His comment was, "Here at Bari the party is profoundly divided at election time, but only in some cases divided concerning the name of the old group leader, who in reality loyally represented the old leadership group, its political line, a mentality that opposed any change." This is one of the first answers to questions about the communist electoral collapse. While the party was not able to make the slogan on the alternative locally credible, the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] and the PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party] of Di Giesi were able at least to achieve credibility among Bari voters for a change of political groups.

The events of the preceding years therefore explain the bewildering progress of the Bari election campaign. When Provincial Secretary Angiuli understood that change was inevitable, and he removed Piccone from the head of the election list, he unleashed a fight against himself. The election campaign was transformed into so many opposing campaigns. This is habitual as far as other parties are concerned. Fortunately, it is not so for the PCI which appropriately is judged on the basis of different parameters. The results (in addition to the sharp change in size of the PCI): Of the ten councillors elected, four had not been selected by the federation, and the citizen secretary who was supposed to have been elected finished fortieth in order of preference. There are also those who maintain that the replacement of Piccone (a comrade with unquestioned administrative ability and with broad ties with the Bari manufacturing world) led the PCI to present a ballot with hands that were "cleaner" but empty...but above all, even bitterest adversaries of the old group leader insist on two points: First, that some among those who "fed" Piccone to the press as a scapegoat, sat beside him on the City Council and were participants in the political line followed there; secondly, that that line came from Rome, and Piccone did nothing but apply it diligently.

How can the Puglia and Bari PCI be rescued from so profound a crisis? According to Franco Cassano, University of Bari professor, that undertaking will be impossible "so long as it believed that the failure of the Puglia PCI to renew itself was due to the domination of leaders with a laboring background. It is necessary to pitilessly analyze the reclassification of the social picture of the laborers themselves in a system where control of the flow of public assistance is predominant. This would lead to a reclassification of the present leaders with a labor origin (whose glorious and richly instructive past no one wants to diminish) to a subalternate and corporative administration of the old basis of consensus, to a tangle of interests with Christian democratic power. For some of the present party leaders, the old Bolshevik language, scorn for the intellectuals (symbolic is the "failure" of the project for a Puglia Gramsci Institute) is used as a blind and an alibi to protect power positions and to cover over a profound process of corruption, including moral corruption."

Cotturri agrees with this: "Certainly, among the old leadership group and the innovators, there was a political clash concerning the interpretation of the national line: an understanding with the Catholic world as a mass movement, or an understanding with the DC at the summit. But even this reading of national policy by the old leaders was an instrument for defense of group interests, not the expression of the laboring class!"

On the other hand many are pessimistic about the possibilities of a reconstruction "from the rank and file" of the Puglia party. Cassano says, "The fact that it was possible to suspect that the PCI of Bari had 'sold out' the trial for Benedetto Petrone tells the true story about the distrust the sections feel toward the leaders. But unfortunately, the charge of 'change that the sections express is reduced merely to a desperate and angry lack of confidence in the leaders.'" In fact, as far as Tanzaella is concerned--toward whom the esteem of all the comrades flows--renewal must take place through three operations: "First to have the strength, from Rome, to fire those who in one way or another were involved in moral questions; second, to find replacements who would not be the pale figures who grew up in the shadows of the old leaders; third, to achieve a new understanding of the southern reality, therefore a new southern line: But in order to do this it is necessary to recover those intellectual forces who in one way or another were pushed aside by the Bari and Puglia party."

[10 Jul 81, pp 7, 8]

[Text] Old and New Forms of a System of Power The surprising speed with which the PSI undermined the DC. Socialist leaders say the business class "wants to change its relationship with the state, which so far has been summed up in the binomial fund for the South plus welfare," a "more efficient" patronage through financial instruments. The south is no longer all welfare and depression.

Bari, July. I began this investigation with an aspect of the Bari debate concerning the party's role in the election results. I did it for various reasons. First of all, because it is the aspect that--even though tied to polemics on isolated

episodes of failure to keep away from affairs that have seen other parties profoundly involved--wound up by initially dominating and almost becoming an obstacle to a more serene examination of other components of the vote and also a more serene historical reconstruction (why the success of 1976?). Not to have spoken of it immediately would have given the impression that one wanted to "change the subject:" subjects that were just surfacing, tertiary considerations, etc. Not that these are lacking. Just as there is a Bari DC and PSI with their own peculiarities that should be studied. But to be different from the others, and the PCI is different from the others, means giving precedence to analyses to what affects us. Which, after all, is what all the Bari comrades are doing, even though with a striking vivacity and the dramatic content.

As has been observed, our party has two souls throughout the south: an ancient one anchored in traditions and to the great struggles (and the name of every city in Puglia evokes these glorious battles); and one that searches for a link with the new reality of development, at times paying a price to the new ideologisms. This is particularly true at Bari. But at the same time an important potential exists for a revival, for a real unity which could take place even on the basis of a more balanced judgment by both sides, of the period of the broad understandings.

I was told that my article contributed to dramatizing the debate. If that is so, I am sorry also because my intention was completely different. Perhaps wrongly, I had received the impression that certain things were to be shouted rather than to be said, affirmed rather than stated as questions, out of concern that things too often repeated over past months might have escaped attention. To have given space and importance in RINASCITA to this aspect of the debate seemed to me to facilitate the passage to an analysis of other aspects: The processes that over the past 5 years have changed the economic, social and political face of Bari.

The changes in the Bari economy, to tell the truth, should not be exaggerated. This city is and always has been tertiary. If anything, from 1976 to date there has been a completion of processes initiated earlier, or there have been changes of quality in sectors already present.

According to the Censis regarding Puglia published by the Ministry of Labor in the "Report on Labor in 1980," taking the year 1970 as a base (index 100), the employed by sector in 1978 dropped to 97.4 in agriculture, rose to 111 in the energy sector, to 116 in industry, stagnated at 102 in construction (at one time a very active sector), rose to 116 in sales services and to 137 in non-sales services (public administration, obviously, is predominant in this). The labor market sees a system of professional training that swallows immense resources but produces little or nothing, high youth unemployment, above all intellectual, partially engaged in precarious and marginal labor. From 1979 to 1980, the rate of activity in Puglia (that is, the percentage of the labor force employed) rose by over 2 percent and the rate of unemployment dropped by 8.2 percent, showing that the labor market is anything but stagnant. But at the same time, the percentage of the labor force willing to work (which therefore enters the market for the first time) rose by 12 percent: There is therefore an unsatisfied labor demand that causes strong pressures on the Puglia economic system.

At Bari, while there seems to have been a failure of the hope for development tied to "emerging" industry, the role of a large traffic center was promoted, thanks also to the impetuous submerged development that affected some areas of the province: the Andria-Trani-Barletta axis and the Putignano-Alberobello axis. The Barletta-Trani area especially has become a real productive force of tertiary Bari.

ISFOL conducted research precisely on this area (see OSSERVATORIO SUL MERCATO DEL LAVORO, No 4, 1980). The results are indicative of changes not only in the economic situation but also in social stratification. The strong process of industrial decentralization begun in this area in the 1970's has led to a widespread change from dependent workers to small entrepreneurs. And this decentralization has clearly local, independent, roots that are not dependent on the north, to the point where they are independently present on foreign markets (for example in Libya) where direct contact with buyers are established.

Bari, therefore, has been energized by this placement of the organizational, financial and business brains of its province and of all of Puglia. But in order to explain the development of this city, according to Franco Botta, professor of labor economics and member of the Puglia Regional Planning Committee, the most important fact "is the progressive transfer of state authority to the region, therefore the power that Bari has to create service structures; this has given space to the new advanced tertiary: marketing, research. Botta adds that another important aspect is that of deficit residues that the regional administration deposits in banks: This has led to an impressive concentration of member banks and windows at Bari compared with the rest of the region, and to a bank competition to capture portions of the region's deposits; and it should be kept in mind that in the Puglia region budget, the share of deposits compared with employment is far higher than in the other regions."

Therefore, according to Franco Cassano, "The essential element to explain the vote is to be found in the processes of transformation and a new kind of tertiary activity tied to public aid. These processes create difficulties for the old worker-laborer leadership, and push aside social and ideological individuals who at one time occupied center stage." To illustrate the Bari business "explosion," Enrico Piccone cites a study he developed on traffic flow into and out of the city: "Some 50,000 automobiles enter Bari every day. If each carries two passengers, that totals 100,000 persons. Railways carry an equal number. We have calculated that this creates a volume of expenditure of 1 trillion lire per year, which gives rise to the growth of business, transportation, banks. Then there are the universities (which have spent 100 billion lire in recent years), the Chamber of Commerce, the Levant Fair. A non-reactionary power block was created around these centers. It consists of businessmen, bureaucrats, working class groups, persons who make a living from illegal activities in small underground, but modern, businesses." According to Franco Passero, president of the savings institution, and one of the PSI's key men, "These groups want to change their relationship with the state which until now was summed up in the binominal Fund for the South plus welfare. The Bari entrepreneurs are fed up: They want only the same conditions that the Milan entrepreneur has, and they will go it alone from there. The other parties have not understood this."

Now it is in all of this that the PSI has inserted itself in an unbiased fashion through the control of many channels for the flow of financial means. It is surprising how rapidly the PSI succeeded in divesting the Bari DC of a hegemony that had endured for 20 years. Unquestionably they played upon the Christian democratic ineptitude in governing the city and its profound corruption. It is sufficient to cite a case that is symbolic even though it is marginal: That of a Christian democrat who, after having established a building cooperative by attracting many partners, escaped abroad with the funds (there is talk of 10 billion lire). Regarding ineptitude, PSI Secretary De Lucia reports that "what at one time was the principal activity, building, has been paralyzed both by too-rigid development planning and by the self-serving inactivity of the communal administration which did nothing to develop new construction areas, rewarding the owners of real estate and possible construction sites who saw the value of their holdings increased by ten times in a few years. Under Mayor Farace, of the 7,000 applications made by construction cooperatives, only 300 could be acted on, with disastrous consequences on the housing crisis which here has some dramatic twists." It could be surprising that reports of this kind come from a party which has already fully administered the Bari power system together with the DC, but it is also proof of how the PSI is moving. Another aspect of the DC inability to govern is witnessed by Vittorio Tanzarella: the scandalous escape of the council from the problem of juvenile delinquency and deviation: such as San Paolo are desolate agglomerates of popular housing, without social centers, meeting places, cultural halls, sports fields; they are schools of delinquency abandoned in the suburbs. The communists have constantly urged the council to act on this plague which has assumed fearful proportions. A conference was even organized on this subject which aroused unexpected interest. But the council did nothing.

More in general, as has already been observed, the decline of the DC comes from the fact that Bari has always been a "toxically dependent" city in relation to Rome. With the center-left Moro had promoted large flows of resources to Bari and to Puglia (at Taranto and Brindisi through the State Participations Agency). Following Moro's death, Lattanzio repalced him in this role, however accentuating the elements of patronage and corruption while the PSI accentuated its control of the channels for the flow of money (Fund for the South, banks). Lattanzio's decline dragged the Bari DC along with it. A significant episode of this process 2 months ago was the ouster of the "great" Matarrese (member of an industrial dynasty closely tied to the DC) from the presidency of the Industrialists Union. Even though the amount of business he did was colossal, he was a personage who had pushed his greed to the point of systematically "inflating" contracts even for the smallest undertakings.

There are those who warn that the Bari DC should not "be buried too soon." One is Dell'Andro, leader of the "purest" Moro followers (whose members, despite the bitter loss of DC votes, achieved a notable success in elections. Dell'Andro says, "This demonstrates that a Moro spirit persists in the DC, rooted above all in the universities and among the youth, and that it is not at all true what certain newspapers have said, that the votes of the Moro supporters have shifted to the PSI." Dell'Andro is very severe in judging the policies conducted by the Lattanzio-Farace pair and says: "I would want to see everything changed in the way the DC administered Bari..." but then he adds, "However, in a direction that is diametrically opposed to what the socialists are preparing to do." Dell'Andro's remark implies a judgment regarding the socialist election success that accentuates the patronage aspect.

There has been and is much talk here in Bari about socialist patronage. Even those who benefit from it talk about it in order to stress the greater efficiency of a certain kind of socialist patronage compared with that of the DC. A big building contractor, involved in the "red tape" of the development plan, does not want to be quoted but this is how he synthesizes the PSI merits: "The socialists operate in a faster and more concrete way..." The socialist secret of success, according to many, is to be found in a happy combination between patronage, efficiency, and an unbiased approach which to some extent overtakes the old DC plan of "welfare." This is not a compliment, but the intention is that it be one.

For Franco Cassano to speak of patronage is getting off the track: "The socialists have two clear ideas about Bari's future: strengthening of its command functions, as an organizational pole for the region, and training of those involved in tertiary activities." According to Angiuli, the PSI "even in the absence of an ideal tension and a great initiative concerning housing and labor problems, succeeded in linking itself--partially and purposefully utilizing also the means of subgovernment--with the masses of youth."

The story of the socialist election campaign, and of the immediately preceding period, is a good illustration of the combination of the elements of success. On the other hand, the socialists already for some time had begun to establish themselves as a "shadow government," seizing crucial power centers from the DC: The Savings Fund (whose president already had been a member of the council for building and president of the gas company), the CSATA center for computer research. The Industrialists Union is already in a state of crisis as a DC appendage. The university and the Levant fair, according to forecasts by Massimo D'Alema, could suffer the same fate. And Gian Carlo Aresta, director of the De Donato [publishing company], recalls that the socialists replaced the DC as a bridge between Bari and Rome some time ago: "The FIME [Southern Investment Trust] directed by Ruffolo, channeled a large amount of money to Puglia; De Michelis, of the State Participations Agency, makes his influence felt on Brindisi and Taranto, not to speak of Formica, Lenoci, the social democrat Di Giesi through the postal service." Aresta concludes, "I have the impression however that the socialists do not have for Bari a model of development which could be an alternative to the model of the Moro followers; I would say, rather, that there has been a substitution of roles while the DC of Lattanzio and Farace played a miserable role in function of a very limited representation of the business class, that which in the 1950's was the basis for consensus in the Monarchist-MSI [Italian Social Movement] councils."

It is possible that the PSI does not have an original model for Bari's development. It is also probable however that it knows how to express within the old model new methods and new priorities in the unbiased use of the public machine. For example, what did the conquest of the Savings Fund Institute mean? First, an affirmation of prestige. Second, that compared with the DC, the power center which is the PSI goal is no longer so much the control of public contracts, but of the essential financial apparatus to oxygenize the potential of local industrial business and tertiary activities. It is interesting, in this sense, to hear the leaders of the professional political class which will provide the political plasma for the PSI. Here are some statements by Professor Romano, CSATA director, "It is shameful that a city like Bari, the southern focal point of the 'Adriatic model' of development,

a bridge to Greece and the Middle East, should have a microscopic, almost comical airport more so when almost everyone, from deputies to technicians to employees, use a plane to go to Rome or Milan. And it is scandalous that Bari still has not computerized its demographic services, thus perpetuating long waits in line, poor service, errors, the waste that now are unknown in Bologna or in Milan." And Passero, president of the Savings Fund, adds, "Bari is typically a southern city, garlanded with tasks that are a kind of alluvial stratification of all the tasks entrusted to the cities in the history of Italy. All the more so in a situation in which the city makes a per capita expenditure that is infinitely less than Rome or Milan. Under these circumstances, must the city administration continue to control an archaic and unprofitable slaughterhouse when very modern businesses exist here in Puglia that perform the same functions? Should it continue to administer a mild processing plant with a very heavy deficit when we could entrust that service to the Emilia cooperatives, run by much more efficient professionals? And the municipal gas plant must spend 40 to 50 billion lire per year to renew its plant. Where will we find that money? Let us turn the service over to AGIP [Italian General Petroleum Agency]: Or will this damage some of the sacred principles of the left?" Passero continues, "Public transportation: A financial shock is needed to make it adequate: the purchase of 300 buses. But money is needed to do this, and where will we find it? But must the public transportation system necessarily be entirely in the hands of the city? Why not admit private resources, so long as the terms are clearly specified? Freed of these burdens, then certainly the city could govern and plan."

But the PSI also has two souls: One tied to the business world, to those trained in tertiary activities, to the new middle class professionals, which aims toward an innovation of political technique, wants to turn public services over to private enterprise, trust itself to private enterprise; the other more tied to the masses and favoring a true change in leadership. The differences can be seen also in the orientation of the new council: center-left or alliance with the communists. In the end the choice will be influenced by Rome. But if it were up to him, Provincial Secretary De Lucia "would be pleased" to have the DC in the opposition, while Passero is more inclined toward a choice that would avoid a frontal clash with the DC, involving political balances at the provincial and regional levels.

I have emphasized, and in some cases, isolated, Bari peculiarities, but it is evident that some questions raised by the election results cannot be circumscribed by the results in Bari and other Puglia centers. Almost as alarming results were obtained in some cities of Campania and Sicily.

Therefore, according to Franco Botta, "The true problem is the party's southern policy. The attempt to understand that the south is no longer all welfare and depression was not pursued. How is it possible to resolve some difficulties that characterize southern small business? The crisis in the large industrial enterprises made it necessary to redefine the relationship between large and small business together. Instead we continued to defend the occupation of big business, and for the small--at least in the south--we did little. It was necessary also to understand how the changes in the international division of labor could open possibilities for new sectors in the south, rather than entrenching ourselves in a secondary defensive position of the traditional sectors."

On the other hand, the same analysis that was made about the new importance of the regional institution of the south makes it impossible to establish an economic plan for the south without having to deal with the state: that welfare state whose crisis has made no small contribution to damaging the political system founded on the DC which has governed the south with iron discipline for 30 years. For this reason, to see this problem only in social terms risks diminishing our own party to a corporative position even though it were to represent only "pieces" of society: And declining election returns at Bari and in other southern communities indicates what the consequences of this negative interpretation could be. While social and economic processes were taking place that slowly eroded an institutional system in the south, perhaps too much of a myth was made of the southern DC without understanding that, as a party, it was a giant with feet of clay. Cassano says, "And without understanding that the DC power system does not stop at the DC, and that there is the risk that the area's leftist forces were sucked into it."

Bari PCI Secretary's Letter to RINASCITA

Dear Editor:

The article that appeared in issue 27 [3 July 1981] of RINASCITA, which claims to analyze the causes of the PCI defeat at Bari had a profound and disconcerting effect on us.

Our organization is going through a difficult period, the election loss has shown the limits and shortcomings of the Bari party and together with that the serious inadequacies of its leaders. Aware of this, the entire party was preparing to deal with the situation in a spirit of sacrifice, to resume the political battle. The severe self-criticism to which we intend to expose ourselves has as its objective the search for political reasons for the election results in order to solve our problems. None of us has placed the defense of his own personal position before this; we wanted to deal with the debate by fully assuming our responsibilities and we have therefore decided to resign from the executive units of the federation in order to permit a free and rigorous discussion. The article in question, distorting the facts and reporting rumors, throws a shadow on the entire Communist Party which, above all, [words missing], constituted a point of reference of the battle for the rebirth of the democratic and class movement of the south. It substitutes the style of the weekly scandal sheet for the method of political analysis.

This is very serious for the Communist Party magazine which, above all in a very difficult moment, should have the task of making a contribution of analysis so that a PCI organization can solve its problems.

(signed) Bari PCI Secretariat

Luciano Barca Comments on Letter

Undoubtedly I made a mistake (since as editor I am responsible for the publication of the article in question) if instead of making a contribution to the debate we ended up by worsening it, as other reactions to the article prove. This pains me. However, I do not believe that it is correct to compare the RINASCITA style with that of a scandal sheet. The RINASCITA method, to which we intend to remain loyal,

is and intends to remain that of truth and rigorous political analysis even if this time the intervention in a debate that was still hot could have led the first part of the investigative report to attach an erroneous importance to an emotional climate.

But I absolutely do not wish to engage in polemics with comrades who are facing difficult tasks with a spirit of sacrifice and with a moral commitment which once more confirms that our party is different from the others, at Bari as elsewhere.

I know that the letter also expresses the pain of the comrades who felt they were unjustly involved in debates referred to by the article published and offended by certain formulations. I am personally honored to be not only a comrade, but also a friend of the Bari and Puglia communists for many years who gave their entire lives to the cause of the laborers and to the working class and who have in some cases spent years in jail for the battles they fought. I especially express my regrets to them, in agreement with Rampini because RINASCITA in its concern with capturing an aspect of the Bari debate, could have injured them and I desire--despite speculation and ulterior motives--to repeat this in public after having said so in private.

[10 Jul 81, p 2]

Letter of Correction by Tanzarella

Dear Editor:

The article by Federico Rampini on the Bari election entitled, "The Problem of a Divided Party (RINASCITA No 27, 3 Jul 81), carrying certain quoted phrases attributed to me, requires a double correction.

(1) I think it is very wrong that the journalist, without having asked my permission in advance, transformed a friendly and informal chat into an interview, and--worse--into a public statement of position in which he makes me assume--a thing that I never intended to do and do not intend to do--the role of "censor" of the party. Precisely because I am not a member, I have considered it necessary always to adopt a line of noninterference regarding the internal affairs of the party, even if in appropriate quarters (a council group or a citizen committee) I have never failed to clearly express my assessments of a party line and the way to achieve it, above all in regard to anything that had to do with city administration.

(2) I do not recognize myself either in form or in substance, in the statements attributed to me: (a) I did not say that "the old group leader loyally represented the old leadership group, its political line, a mentality that was hostile to any change." I did not make those statements. (b) Regarding the closing phrase of the article I must state that I spoke of "power groups" and not of "moral questions" (even if--I must add in the interest of clarity--I consider it indispensable to adopt an attitude of absolute intransigence on this terrain if and when questions of that kind arise on any level). Also, I emphasize the present difficulties of creating a new leadership within the party (and not only of the need to rescue the intellectuals who "emigrated"), that would have solid roots in the city and an adequate understanding of the new processes that have matured in the southern reality.

I request that you publish the full text of the above, and I extend cordial greetings.

(signed) Vitorio Tanzarella, Esq.

POLL SHOWS VOTERS PREFER VAN AGT AS PREMIER

[Text] The Hague, 30 June--Forty-one percent of the Dutch people want Van Agt again as premier. That is the result of a Nipo [Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion] poll of a random sample of 1,140 persons. The name Van Agt was spontaneously mentioned by those questioned while no names of possible candidates were listed. Den Uyl came in as second with 21 percent, followed by Terlouw with 11 percent, Wiegel cornered 3 percent of the vote.

Eighty one percent of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] voters preferred Van Agt, 7 percent of the PvdA [Labor Party] voters did so, and 30 percent of the D'66 [Democrats 1966]. Fifty-nine percent of the VVD voters preferred Van Agt.

Three percent of the CDA voters want Terlouw as prime minister, one percent want Den Uyl, and nobody favors Wiegel. Fifty-seven percent of the PvdA followers want Den Uyl to be the new premier, 15 percent want Terlouw and nobody wants Wiegel.

Fifteen percent of the VVD voters prefer their own leader Wiegel, 2 percent prefer Terlouw, and nobody is in favor of Den Uyl.

CS0: 3105/147

SOCIALIST ORGAN LOOKS AT INFLUENCE OF PARTY YOUTH GROUP

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 22 Jul 81 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text] During these days the Labor Youth organization is gathering for its traditional summer camp session on Utoya. This is the last mobilization of the AUF [Labor Youth] people before a hectic election campaign begins.

Those taking part in this year's camp can rejoice over great activity in all branches of the organization. In recent years AUF has used most of its energy on building up an effective organization. This humdrum activity became necessary after the many difficult years in the late 1960's and early 1970's. There is still a lot left to do. It is not easy to carry out radical political work among young people in a time characterized by winds blowing from the right.

Even so, the tedious work in the AUF ranks has borne fruit. In the last 2 years over 100 new local groups have been formed. Today there are over 400 AUF groups spread across the entire country. Each county has its own district secretary and in the election campaign activity will be stepped up even further through separate youth secretaries in several parts of the country.

Like the Labor Party in general AUF's biggest job is to insure victory in the Storting election. Of the almost 3 million voters entitled to vote on 14 September, 122,000 are first-time voters. Unfortunately fewer and fewer of the youngest voters have been picking the Labor Party as an election alternative. In 1969 almost 50 percent of first-time voters chose the Labor Party. In the 1979 municipal elections the figure was 31 percent. At that crossroads the Conservatives had more support in this age group than the Labor Party, namely 34 percent.

There are many goals for AUF activity in this election campaign. One of them is to make sure that a majority of first-time voters regard the Labor Party as their major alternative.

In the period that has elapsed since the last Storting election a central social problem has emerged that is becoming increasingly urgent, namely the opportunity of young people to find a social and economic foothold. It has been a natural task for AUF to form a concrete policy in this area.

The so-called youth guarantee will be central for AUF in the campaign in this particular context. The Labor Party earlier made it part of its program that all young people under 20 should be given the prospect of having a job or getting some kind of training. In the last few years unemployment--both visible and concealed--has hit young people under 20 especially hard. Therefore the binding guarantee pledged by the Labor Party is an effective means of preventing unemployment. However this is an expensive reform in tight economic times. AUF is now demanding an early redemption of the youth guarantee. This involves around 120,000 young people. This has been further underlined by the start of a new school year with new reports daily on lack of space for large classes of young people. Even though the reform will cost money we like AUF must admit that failing to put this idea into practice will be even more costly for society in the long run. A large group of young people "on the loose" can be equated with increased drug abuse, increased criminality and big social problems.

The other central issue for AUF in this election campaign will be working for peace and disarmament. In the past the political opposition has tried to score points on the basis of differences of opinion on security policy issues in AUF and in the parent party. This time a united movement is putting security policy and arms action in focus. The program resolution on nuclear-free zones in Nordic region has more than anything else in recent years united the labor movement in a mutual effort in the international area.

6578

CSO: 3108/177

POLL CONFIRMS STEADY GROWTH IN SUPPORT FOR NONSOCIALISTS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Aug 81 p 3

[Text] So far in the election year of 1981 there has been great political stability in Norway. The Labor Party will have to make up for a big non-socialist head start if the party is to retain ruling power after the election. The three big non-socialist parties have a good chance of getting a majority on their own--without the help of the Liberals. This appears from calculations based on polls from the three institutes, the Market and Media Institute, the Norwegian Opinion Institute and Norwegian Market Data, added up for each month.

A calculation of representatives based on the average for the second quarter of 1981, i.e. the opinion polls of all three institutes for the months of April, May and June, shows that the Labor Party would lose nine seats, declining from 76 to 67, while SV [Socialist-Left Party] would go from two to three seats. The Conservatives would go from 41 to 53 seats, the Christian People's Party would be cut from 22 to 17 seats, the Center Party would retain its 12 seats and the Liberals would go from two to three seats. This means that the three big non-socialist parties would have a majority of 82 to 73. If we count the Liberals among the non-socialist parties there would be a hefty non-socialist majority of 15 (85-70).

The calculations are based on parties increasing or declining relatively equally in each county. Thus they are much more reliable with respect to the total number of seats for each party than they are for the distribution of seats by individual counties. With this reservation we can report that the Labor Party would lose two seats in Oslo and one each in the counties of Buskerud, Hedmark, Hordaland, Rogaland, South Trondelag, Telemark and Ostfold. SV would pick up one seat in South Trondelag while the Conservatives would get two new seats in Oslo and in Akershus plus one new seat in the counties of Buskerud, Hordaland, More, Nordland, Rogaland and South Trondelag, West Agder and Ostfold.

Changes in the joint list combinations create extra shifts for the middle parties. All calculations show that this time the Center Party will get special benefits from joint lists so that the party will be able to retain 12 seats even if it loses some ground in the election. The Christian People's Party is in the opposite situation. The new joint list combinations seem to mean that the party might lose seats both in Buskerud and in Vestfold even if the party maintains its position with the voters. But the joint list in Hedmark means that the party will probably have representation in this county for the first time.

The calculations show that the Center Party would lose seats in Akershus and West Agder but gain seats in Buskerud and Telemark. The Christian People's Party would win seats in Hedmark but would lose six seats in the counties of Akershus, Buskerud, Hordaland, More, Nordland and Vestfold.

The Liberals would lose their seat in South Trondelag because the joint list has been dissolved there but in compensation the figures show they would gain new seats in Hordaland and Vestfold.

Of course there are obvious uncertainties connected with such estimates of representation but this at least indicates the seats to keep an eye on during the election.

And the point of departure before the fall election is now clear. Now it is up to the many participants in the election campaign to influence the final results. To the extent that the chance of a good election result stimulates party workers in a campaign it seems obvious that the initial situation will encourage some and discourage others.

The table below shows the percentage of support for different parties in the last Storting election in 1977, in the county council election in 1979 and the average of all the opinion polls taken in the last five quarters.

Party	1977	1979	1 9 8 0		4th quart.	1 9 8 1	
			2d quart.	3d quart.		1st quart.	2d quart.
Labor	42.3	36.0	39.1	38.1	33.8	35.5	36.9
Conservatives	24.8	29.9	28.8	29.1	30.6	31.9	31.9
Christian People's Party	12.4	10.2	10.9	10.9	11.7	10.9	10.6
Center	8.6	8.6	7.2	7.4	7.3	6.5	7.2
Socialist-Left	4.2	4.4	4.6	4.9	5.7	5.8	4.8
Liberals	3.2	5.3	4.7	4.9	5.6	5.0	4.3
Progressives	1.9	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.9	2.2	2.4
Liberal People's Party	1.4	1.3	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.8
Labor + SV	46.5	40.4	43.7	43.0	39.5	41.3	41.7
Conservatives + Christian People's + Center	45.8	48.7	46.9	47.4	49.6	49.3	49.7
Liberals + SV	7.4	9.7	9.3	9.8	11.3	10.8	9.1

The Labor Party has probably had the biggest shifts. If we put together the three opinion polls for the individual months in the last half year the Labor Party has the following figures from January 1981 to June 1981: 33.5, 35.5, 37.4, 37.3, 37.5 and 35.8 percent. This shows that in the 2 months after the shift in prime ministers the party advanced 4 percent from 33.5 to 37.4 percent. But that was

the end of the gains. The next 2 months showed them standing still and then losing almost half the gains in June. The party's starting position is now weak. To stay in power the party must increase its support 7-8 percent before the election. The last time the party had comparable support in an election corresponding to the June opinion poll figures was in the 1973 Storting election. The Labor Party won 62 seats then with 35.3 percent of the votes, in other words 14 less than the party has in Storting now.

The Labor Party has not succeeded in regaining a lead of 7-8 percent in Storting elections. In the 1969 Storting election the election results were 46.5 percent while the average in the opinion polls in the second quarter that year was 44.6 percent. In 1973 the second quarter average was 39.3 percent with the election results down as far as 35.3 percent. In 1977 the average support for the Labor Party in the second quarter was 41.4 percent with the election results 0.9 percent higher, i.e. 42.3 percent. Therefore the starting position of the Labor Party is weak before the final spurt in this year's election campaign.

The Conservative Party has great stability and the Labor shifts in the first half of 1981 have had little influence on this party's support. The average Conservative figures for the first 6 months of 1981 are: 32.4, 31.6, 31.7, 32.3, 31.7 and 31.7 percent, in other words the difference between the best and the worst results was only 0.8 percent. An election result at this level would give the party between 50 and 55 seats compared with the 41 it has now.

The Christian People's Party showed similar evenness: 10.9, 10.9, 10.9, 10.4, 10.5 and 10.8 percent. Since it is known from experience that voters for this party are not reached as effectively in opinion polls as voters for other parties the poll figures for the first half year indicate that the Christian People's Party could end up with election results lower than those in the 1977 election when the party received 12.4 percent of the vote. But the party has a number of very exposed seats so a slight decline could have big consequences on the distribution of seats.

The Center Party has made some gains in the first half of 1981 with the figures for the 6 months being 6.4, 6.4, 6.7, 6.9, 7.1 and 7.6 percent. Thus the Center Party is approaching its 1977 election result of 8.6 percent and in that case the party will probably increase its number of seats, partly because of new joint lists and partly because the party was especially unlucky in the 1977 distribution of seats.

The Liberal Party has had some declines since the party reached its top score of 5.8 percent in November 1980. In 1981 the averages for the 6 months were 5.7, 5.0, 4.4, 4.4, 4.2 and 4.3 percent. Around the beginning of the year it looked as if the party could increase its Storting representation from 2 to 5-7 seats but the declines this year indicate the party will not increase its Storting group substantially.

The Socialist-Left Party declined somewhat in 1981. The figures for the 6 months are 6.3, 6.1, 5.0, 4.5, 4.7 and 5.2 percent. This suggests that the party might be able to add one or two seats to its 2-man Storting group. But the distribution of votes will determine this. Thus in 1965 the Socialist People's Party had only two seats with 6 percent of the votes.

The Progressive Party noted these figures in 1981: 2.5, 2.2, 2.0, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.4 percent, in other words it had great stability. The party must make some gains in order to be represented, of course, and the chances for this seem best in Hordaland.

The Liberal People's Party is stable with figures of 0.8, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.8 and 0.8 percent. When the party got one seat--in Hordaland--in the 1973 election the party had nationwide support of 3.4 percent, in other words many times the party's current support level.

6578

CS0: 3108/177

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN REDUCED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 15 Jul 81 pp 1, 7

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET Bureau) Turkey has decided to reduce the level of its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. The Turkish government has decided that our ambassador in Afghanistan be recalled and that Turkey be represented at the charge d'affaires level in that country. The decision was made unilaterally. The ANKA [Ankara News Agency] agency reported, based on information provided by an official at the Afghanistan embassy in Ankara who asked that his name be withheld, that Afghanistan would not act similarly nor reduce the level of its relations with Turkey.

The decision by the Turkish government to reduce its relations with Afghanistan was characterized by western diplomatic circles in the capital as overdue.

Following the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan, NATO member western nations have, within the past year, adopted a resolution to recall their ambassadors from Afghanistan's capital city, Kabul, and to cool or freeze their relations. In the wake of this resolution, a large number of NATO countries recalled their Kabul ambassadors and left a charge d'affaires to run their representations.

Turkey did not adopt this resolution at the start of the affair and the fact that it did not recall its ambassador became a subject of criticism at western missions in Ankara. Now after nearly a year has passed since then, Ankara is implementing the NATO resolution.

Accordingly, the Turkish ambassador, Ilhan Akay, who has completed his tour of service in Kabul, will return to Ankara but no new ambassador will be appointed in his stead. Rather, Altan Guven, who has been assigned to Kabul as minister-counselor, will serve as charge d'affaires.

It was reported that the Turkish government's decision was unilateral. Although Turkey has recalled its ambassador, Afghanistan's ambassador in Ankara, Abdurrezzak will remain at his post.

Afghan Embassy

The ANKA agency reported that an official at Afghanistan's Ankara embassy stated that they accepted "with respect" Turkey's decision to recall its Kabul ambassador and replace him with a charge d'affaires. According to ANKA's report, the Afghan diplomat said that "we will not follow the same path. We will not reduce the level of our diplomatic relations with Turkey.

GENERAL PROPOSES USE OF RESERVES TO INCREASE MILITARY READINESS

Bonn DIE WELT in German 18/19 Jul 81 p 6

[Article by Ruediger Moniac: "A Way To Strengthen the Bundeswehr's Backbone-- Reservists Can, Without Additional Cost, Increase Defense Readiness"]

[Text] In times of an increasing lack of funds, which is especially felt by the Bundeswehr, any proposals designed to eliminate deficiencies in national defense without additional cost are of particular interest. Colonel Eberhard Fuhr of the General Staff recommends that the potential of the reserves, largely unused these days, be used for that purpose.

At present, Fuhr is in command of the Heimatschutz [National Guard] Brigade 56 in Neuburg/Donau. Until last fall, he was an expert adviser on military national defense problems in Bonn's general staff of the armed forces. He sees deficiencies in many of the territorial defense tasks, in civil defense and in the security of essential facilities in the FRG which are necessary to provide for the public in times of crisis or war and for the maintenance of law and order.

In a lecture in Munich, Fuhr made an impressive case for his contention that the FRG is making relatively little use of its trained reserves for strengthening the national defense. While in Finland, for instance, 15 percent of able-bodied citizens are in the armed forces, 10 percent in Switzerland and 9 percent in Sweden, only 2 percent are so employed in the FRG. Even Austria, with 2.1 percent, is superior to Germany in this respect.

According to the colonel, almost 3 million reservists trained by the Bundeswehr have not been called up for additional duties with the armed forces. About one half of that number are not even on the defense rolls any more.

Fuhr recommended that these reservists be called up for defense duties. In view of the "political, conceptual, economic and financial restrictions which forbid beefing up the armed forces, at least for the intermediate term, with reservists who do not have specific duty assignments of their own," this could be accomplished in a cheaper and simpler manner.

Among the methods of accomplishing this, he cites "an enhanced mission of military familiarization of reservists outside the Bundeswehr." This exists even at present,

though to a much lesser extent than Fuhr has in mind. The Reserve Association is even now engaged in providing Bundeswehr training courses to its roughly 80,000 volunteer members in such subjects as handgun firing, marching, and self and buddy-system help. However, the colonel would go beyond that and would make the 1 million-man reserve force available for specific, well-defined national defense tasks. The colonel cited an example drawn from his familiarity with the Eastern Bavarian region to demonstrate how such a plan could be translated into reality. In cities and towns there is no protection available for such civilian facilities with military significance as transformer stations, bridges, or post offices containing telecommunications facilities. No manpower is available which would, in time of crisis or war, maintain essential communications, observe ABC defense or to repair damage as far as possible. Apart from this, cooperation between the military and civil authorities is insufficiently developed, since manpower is lacking for this also.

However, a typical district city has a Reserve Association post with 120 members, 90 of whom have no Bundeswehr assignment and are therefore "inactive."

According to the colonel's proposal, these 90 reservists could be formed into three platoons, the first to perform guard duty for the security of essential facilities, the second to act as an engineer platoon for repair work, and the third as a staff platoon for telecommunications, ABC defense and military-civil cooperation tasks.

The leaders of these three platoons (platoon and squad leaders) would be drawn from among the Reserve Association post membership. They would be reservists who showed sufficient motivation and who would be able to fulfill those duties in addition to their civilian occupation and without pay. The reservists would be personally responsible for conducting training in their platoons, based on applicable Bundeswehr regulations.

Says Colonel Fuhr: "I imagine that the reservists during their meetings would occupy themselves with the theory and practice of tasks entrusted to them, i.e., with training as security guards, engineer, communications and ABC defense specialists.

Similarly, the expert envisions the basic and continuing training of platoon and squad leaders. He would entrust the responsibility for a flawless functioning of the system to the so-called organizational manager, a position which already exists in the Reserve Associations of one out of every three Land districts. Among his tasks would be the mobilization and deployment of the platoons, which he would initiate in close liaison with the local defense district command and with the head management official of the Land district responsible for civil defense activities.

Nor should the materiel required for equipping the platoons (equipment, vehicles, engines) constitute more than a minimal drain on the defense budget. To bring this about, the colonel proposes that such materiel be drawn from the "mobilization materiel reserve" as well as from the "utilization of civilian resources," as provided in the regulations for emergency mobilization and defense. In other words, not only reserve personnel, but also reserve equipment and materiel would be activated.

This reserve mobilization would not constitute an enlargement of the army's regular active duty combat effectiveness. The way Colonel Fuhr puts it, the "militia" would merely perform "simple tasks." However, his concept would serve to enhance "total defense," i.e., the integration of and cooperation between military and civil defense. As long ago as 1973, the Defense Structure Commission had advocated the establishment of militia units, because "an individual in compulsory military service mobilized in the immediate vicinity of his home is much better motivated toward his duties in preventive defense readiness."

The Mobilization Plan

If the Bundeswehr, in concert with other NATO armed forces, had to mobilize during a political crisis so as to augment its deterrent effect, its manpower would more than double. In time of peace, 495,000 persons serve in the FRG armed forces. About 220,000 of these are draftees. A mobilization would add more than 700,000 reservists, thus making a theoretical total of 1.2 million persons in case of emergency.

This augmentation would occur in several phases. To begin with, about 30,000 men of the ready reserve would immediately join the active force. This could only be brought about by order of the Federal government and without a Bundestag declaration of emergency. Phase II of the mobilization provides for complementing support units in the army, air force and navy. This is followed by bringing national guard brigades and regiments, and finally the many rear guard units, up to strength. Their mission is to secure the operational area for the main allied forces and to ensure cooperation with civil authorities.

According to the mobilization plan, all so-called alarm and ready reservists are to be on active duty within 72 hours.

9273

CSO: 3103/393

CDU/CSU QUERIES MILITARY ON PROBLEMS

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 18 Jul 81 p 4

[Article: "Federal Government Asked To Give Information About Internal Conditions Within Bundeswehr"]

[Text] Bonn, 17 July--AP/REUTER--On Friday the CDU/CSU challenged the Federal Government to comment on the internal conditions within the Bundeswehr and on the state of soldiers within the armed forces. A large-scale inquiry, the topic of which--according to the Union--is to be debated in early fall by the Bundestag, is to induce the Federal Government to finally take concrete measures to improve the state of soldiers, to increase their motivation for the service, to alleviate the shortage of officers and noncommissioned officers and to reduce the excessive demand on the time of senior officers.

Peter Wuerzbach, spokesman for the defense policy of the Union, reasoned that structural defects had not been corrected in spite of many announcements and bureaucratic demands within the Bundeswehr had become more and more prolific. Commanders are spending 30 percent of their time on complying with bureaucratic regulations, although 5 percent of their time should be sufficient. Among soldiers complaints about unproductive activities are increasing; in other words, there are complaints about superfluous routines, particularly among compliant draftees.

Other problems to which the government is supposed to reply, according to Wuerzbach, are the question of personnel management, the stagnation in the utilization of certain ranks, as well as the entire operating and working atmosphere where human warmth, free conversation, trust and comradeship are frequently missing. The Union also wants concrete information on the development of the composition of personnel since 1979, arranged according to rank: officers, noncommissioned officers with and without portepee, units and draftees.

While explaining the large-scale inquiry, Wuerzbach also submitted a resolution proposal, according to which the government is to submit in the future annual reports on the latest state of efforts concerning arms control and disarmament as well as on the changes in the balance of military strength.

The FRG Ministry of Defense and the SPD reacted immediately, energetically rejecting the Union's accusations concerning internal conditions within the Bundeswehr. A ministry spokesman stated that although the answer to the large-scale inquiry is still outstanding, one thing can already be settled now: The accusations made by Deputy Wuerzbach are not true in their current form.

The spokesman pointed out that the results of the De-Maiziere Commission investigation on the readiness of the armed forces will be released in the fall; in addition, the effectiveness of the Center for Orientation and Indoctrination will be strengthened and the use of counselors will be increased. Furthermore, since 1980 there has been a significant increase in the number of applicants signing up for a term in the military. On 1 July military pay and severance pay was increased; for soldiers with many years of service there are bonuses.

8991

CSO: 3103/391

GENERAL FAULTS MILITARY MORALE

Bonn DIE WELT in German 18, 19 Jul 81 p 1

[Article by Ruediger Moniac: "General Brandt Deplores Lack of Esprit De Corps--Reasons: Personnel Turnover, Specialization and Nightly Flight From the Barracks"]

[Text] Bonn - The chief of staff of the armed forces recently addressed his commanders with serious warnings about an increasing lack of comradeship among the soldiers. In INFORMATION FOR COMMANDERS 1/81, General Juergen Brandt stated that he had been observing this process of erosion particularly among the enlisted men. Following basic training, he wrote, the "symptoms of atrophy of comradeship are worrisome."

Among the reasons for this the general considers the frequent personnel turnover in the units. Specialization in the training and duties of the soldiers no longer permits a sense of cohesion and mutual confidence "in many places and to the extent desired." In addition, the nightly flight from the barracks after duty hours serves to restrict the soldiers' off-duty contacts which serve to promote comradeship, he said. The chief of staff warned particularly against negative effects of evolving "hierarchies" among the men: "Questionable 'initiation rites' have in some instances exceeded acceptable limits." The desirable esprit de corps among the troops is being impaired by "physical and psychological violence among them."

The general challenged the commanders to generate among supervisors in their commands incentives toward promoting esprit de corps. Their primary objective should be to instill mutual confidence among their soldiers. Says Brandt: "Comradeship between people of unequal rank is possible only when a superior has the confidence of his subordinates and vice versa."

The government's opposition in Bonn is also disturbed about conditions within the armed forces and therefore addressed a parliamentary question to the Federal government, consisting of a series of inquiries as to what measures are being taken by the Ministry of Defense to improve the situation. Peter-Kurt Wuerzbach, spokesman for the CDU/CSU parliamentary group for defense matters, stated in this connection that there is a vast difference between claims and reality despite Minister Hans Apel's many announcements to the effect that the human element and its working conditions in the armed forces must be given preferential attention.

In this context, the CDU politician called particular attention to the relationship between the draftees and their immediate superiors. Those especially, who

"primarily lead, educate and train the young soldiers during the first significant period of their service, have for years been faced with increasingly severe manpower and structural shortages in the armed forces." Wuerzbach spoke about the shortage of leaders in the units; about excessive demands being made within certain time frames; about the tendency toward theoretical rather than practical training; and criticized stagnation in assignments which leaves superiors too long in a job for which they have become overqualified.

This, he said, creates a "tendency to give up." Increasingly, instructor personnel are "quietly neglecting their service duties in favor of private interests outside the service." The management and work climate, he said, have become more impersonal due to an increase in bureaucracy, because an anonymous style of leadership which depends on checklists is taking hold, which goes hand in hand with a tendency toward pedantic flank protection.

9273

CS0: 3103/393

IMPORTANCE OF ISLAMIC INVOLVEMENT STRESSED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 14 Jul 81 p 11

[Interview with Prof Dr Huseyin Atay, dean of the School of Theology at Ankara University by TERCUMAN reporter Yasar Nuri Ozturk; date and place not specified]

[Text] Question: You know that the pretext for the outbreak against religious training and education is the "freedom of conscience" concept. What is your view on this matter?

Answer: Whenever the topic of discussion turns to the teaching of religious subjects in the schools aimed at giving information and culture in equal measure to everyone as is the case with other subjects, the fact is that this is opposed by the concept of freedom of conscience. This method is very conducive to either secretly or unconsciously creating anti-religious feelings under the name of freedom of conscience. In fact, people like these go so far as to say that there is no need for religious knowledge whatsoever. Let me here touch on two points I consider important:

a. There has to be a distinction between conscience and knowledge. Knowing religion is one thing, believing those things you know and practicing what you believe is another thing since practicing without believing is not accepted by religion. Religious knowledge will explain and teach what religion is and is not. In the same way that a person who is not a Turk studies and learns Turkish history in school, so too, a non-Moslem can study and learn about Islam. People who experience an education like this respect one another's religion; they avoid hurting each other's religious feelings. If a person does not know about the religion of another, how can he respect that religion?

In our country the non-Moslem minority is only one percent of the general population. In a number of wards in certain settled regions like Izmir and Istanbul, claiming that Turks are the minority, opposition has developed against teaching religious subjects to students on an equal basis with other subjects. In our opinion this is not correct. At the Kumkapi secondary school in Istanbul where Jews, Greeks and Armenians are concentrated, there were no non-Turkish students in group A of the classes that I was in for three years. I recall that in group B there was one non-Turkish student and in the other groups two or three non-Turkish students.

They generally attend their own private schools. Acting as if they are the majority in our schools, exploiting the freedom of conscience problem and opposing the education of Turkish children in a normal and legitimate way, we believe, are subjects worthy of consideration from the standpoint of Turkishness before Islam. At this point I want to, as a debt of conscience, disclose the very difficult position of our youth. They, on the one hand, are the heirs to representatives of narrow and dull religious, scientific and ideological freedoms which are the remains of the 17th and 18th centuries in our country. On the other hand, they are also the heirs to the representatives of an anti-religious mentality passed to us from 19th century Europe. The heirs of these two mentalities are in a struggle with each other, secretly and in the open, to control the administration and politics in our country and, in fact, more importantly, training and education. The religious concepts of these two mentalities are at the same level. There is no dialogue between the two. One of them, being afraid of giving a small concession to religion, acknowledges freedom of ideas only to those who think as they do. It characterizes all ideas of atheism and anti-religion as progressive, considers them necessary and acknowledges then unlimited freedom. The other one opposes freedom of ideas and considers anyone who doesn't think as they do to be an atheist. They worry that if freedom of ideas is permitted, religion will be ruined. These two opposite poles, much as in physics the way two opposite poles negate each other, likewise reduce each other's strength to zero and prevent the country from progressing.

The general education and especially the religious education of our country is being thrown back and forth in contradictions between the wrong religious concepts of these two mentalities. In this situation, education and religious education cannot be appropriately resolved for our era and the realities of our country. What we want to establish is the need for aiming to teach pure, clean and truthful religion apart from these two mentalities which incorrectly understand religion, and far from superstition and ideological and philosophical enmity. The Moslem religion has for more than 1000 years formed the culture, history, and civilization of the Turkish nation, molded them together and fortified them. Turks protected their national unity and solidarity by accepting religion. To rip the Turkish nation from its own culture and civilization would be to leave her without history and civilization and make her like a rootless tree. It is undeniably clear that the anarchy which grieved our nation so, played an important, that is a leading, role in the disruption of education and training that was the basis of the destructive activities directed against the Turkish nation and state. Wasn't one of these disruptions and attitude of those who meticulously showed their opposition to religion and deprived the nation of any kind of indication that hinted at the existence of religion?

Question: As a result what are your proposals?

Answer: My proposals are these:

By making religious subjects electives, in violation of the Unified Instruction Law, the problem of religious training and education has been complicated and put into a dead-end situation. The government has tried to address and resolve the rightful and legitimate needs of the nation through an attitude contrary to the realities of the nation and scientific data. For this reason it has so far been unsuccessful.

In accordance with the Unified Instruction Law, religious subjects should be taught to everyone, from primary school to the end of high school, in equal measure within the structure of a graduated system, and unnecessary repetition should be avoided. Importance should be given to catechism instruction in initial training, but in the high schools religious principles, their goals and religious philosophies should be discussed. The ability to find the broad meaning of religion, religious tolerance and different ideologies and not necessarily consider these to be antagonistic must be taught.

Religious training should be planned for at three levels:

a. An education system for all youth that will, on an equal basis, grant them religious knowledge and culture. This will be realized through an education that will be administered from the first class of primary school to the last class of high school. Such an implementation, which would make Ataturk's holy spirit glad, has been expressed in the Unified Instruction Law. We understand that Ataturk wanted to prevent sectarian clashes by means of this.

b. In order that individuals can be trained to be imams so that the nation's daily and weekly religious services are provided, the imamhatip [religious training] schools should continue to serve in accordance with the aims with which they were established.

c. The number of schools of theology, opened to train religious scholars, specialists, and thinkers, should be increased. In order to accomplish this the High Islamic Institute existing today should be tied to their regional universities as colleges of theology thereby accelerating the opening of a theology college at each university. The incorporation of High Islamic Institute colleges into universities would be in accordance with the unified instructions, would increase the chances of making them a science and raise their status.

In our opinion, this sir, is the most important point. Religious training should be under the control of the state and government. As in every other case, we are in concert with the state on this matter and on its side. We believe that the unity of the state is tied to the union of the nation's thoughts and feelings. It is plain to see that leaving religious knowledge and culture, which have provided the nation's unity of spirit and conscience and are its most important element, in disarray has not been, nor can it be, of use to the nation.

Question: What do you mean by disarray?

Answer: Religious training not under state control. For example, there are many courses of the Koran that are not under the supervision of the [ministry of] religious affairs. These create ignorance and degenerate and exploit religion. Guardians who regard the religious education which their children receive from school as insufficient are, instead, applying for these courses. In order to prevent this we must free the guardians from feeling the need to do this.

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